The Graveyard: striking a balance

1) Ali, T. (2008). The Duel: Pakistan on the flight path of American Power. New York: Scribner.

The central argument of Tariq Ali is that, currently the United States is using Pakistan in the same way it did during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980’s. Moreover, he strongly objects to the claims of both American and Afghans about Pakistan’s role in destabilizing Afghanistan. The problems of instability in Afghanistan, he maintains, arise not from muddling of Pakistan, but their source is the ethnic make up of the country and the tribal rivalries that go back centuries. Furthermore, Ali blames the United States for the ills of Pakistan and argues that the United States’ goals of rebuilding Afghanistan and Pakistan—in the same way it rebuilt Germany and Japan after the WWII—are misguided since the two countries are both dysfunctional or failed states.

Ali also objects to the notion of the “good war”—a phrase used by the then candidate and now President Obama and argues that the Afghan war will continue to deteriorate year after year because the Afghans will never support an occupation. He argues for NATO’s withdrawal from Afghanistan. The bulk of his sources in this work consist of government documents—reports of various commissions, and testimonies.

The author’s claims are contrary to what I’m arguing for or advancing in this project. His analysis of the current situation is misguided in that it is shallow and politically biased. Pakistan’s muddling in Afghanistan has a whole history behind it and has contributed immensely to the ills of Afghanistan. This is a rare argument to make and therefore Ali’s work is a good criticism of my thesis and I’ll be addressing it throughout this project.

2) Akbarzadeh, S. (June, 2003). India and Pakistan’s geostrategic rivalry in Central Asia. Contemporary South Asia, 12, 219-228. Retrieved September 16, 2009, from Academic Search Premiere database.

Shahram Akbarzadeh examines strategic interests of India and Pakistan in Central Asia and argues that with the toppling of the Taliban in neighboring Afghanistan, India is in a much more advantageous position. According to the author, because of the energy sources in Central Asia and both countries’ desire for prominence in the region, Pakistan and India (among other players in region) have rivaled each other. But since Afghanistan is a route for the exercise of that influence, it has been a ground of competition for both of them.

This work will be helpful to me in measuring the Indian-factor in Pakistan’s policies towards Afghanistan. I also agree with the author’s conclusion; India’s influence in Afghanistan has grown tremendously since the toppling of the Taliban. More importantly, Pakistan has voiced its concerns over India’s growing presence in Afghanistan and has criticized India.

3) Carpenter, T. D. (1994). The Unintended Consequences of Afghanistan. World Policy Journal, 11 (1), 76-87. Retrieved September 16, 2009, from Academic Search Premiere database.

The author in this article recounts the process by which American dollars and weapons were reaching the resistant fighters in Afghanistan during the Soviet occupation. In the process, he argues that Pakistan was given too much freedom in channeling that aid to the various groups. And because of that freedom, the author maintains, Pakistan ran a comprehensive strategy with its own goals and objectives while using the American aid. According to the author, Pakistan’s control was to the extent that it chose which resistant fighters should receive the aid and those chosen always promoted Pakistani interests. Even more, he insists, Pakistan continued to aid certain radical groups after America washed its hands off the region. He argues that this was the result of American underestimation of its leverage with Pakistan.

The author argues that the consequences of letting Pakistan dominate (as well as U.S.’s ignorance of the Afghanistan after the Soviet withdrawal) were the bloody civil war in Afghanistan and complete destruction of that society. More importantly, the author states, the seeds of radicalism were planted.

Carpenter’s argument can be an answer to the voices that call for the withdrawal of NATO forces from Afghanistan and provide a historical context for the current situation there. Since he analyzes what happened when the world washed its hands off Afghanistan after the Soviets withdrew and left the country in the hands of Pakistan, it informs the current debate over whether the U.S. should abandon that country since it no longer presents a threat to its security. Carpenter’s work will be evidence for the reasons I give in support of why the U.S. should commit this time and not abandon Afghanistan.

4) Ganguly, S. (2000). Pakistan’s Never-Ending Story: Why the October Coup Was No Surprise. Foreign Affairs, 79 (2), 2-7. Retrieved October 15, 2009, from Academic Search Complete database.

The author looks at the history of Pakistani politics and provides the reasons for Pakistan’s political instability. According to him, Pakistan’s woes can be tracked to the day of inception of Pakistan. The author maintains that because the country did not develop civil institutions and the military and intelligence services tightened their grip on power from the beginning, Pakistan has experienced political instability and has suffered military coups. In light of the then recent coup (the story was written after the coup of 1999,) the author outlines the steps the Pakistani ruler must take to prevent further instability. Moreover, Ganguly argues that the United States must push Pakistan to reform its civil institutions, improve relations with India, and stop supporting terrorism in Kashmir and the Taliban in Afghanistan.  

Ganguly accurately points to the dark spots in Pakistani politics and the reasons for that. He also warns (back then) against the very policies the United States have developed towards Pakistan since 9/11. However, this argument was made in pre-9/11 period and much has changed since then. This work will provide me with examples of the missteps on the part of the United States in dealing with Pakistan.

5) Hathaway, R. M. (March, 2008). Leverage and Largess: Pakistan’s post-9/11 partnership with America. Contemporary South Asia, 16 (1), 11-24. Retrieved September 16, 2009, from Academic Search Premier database.

The author argues why it is an illusion to assume, as many have done so, that the United States—given its power and lavish aid to Pakistan— have had leverage over it in the two countries’ relationship since 9/11. Specifically, according to the author, the United States did not have the leverage in pushing Pakistan towards democratic reforms or forcing it to get tougher in the war against terrorism. In the former’s case, he maintains, it was because General Musharraf was the United States’ best bet in executing the war on terror and therefore the U.S. did not attempt strongly to leverage Pakistan. In the latter’s case, the author argues that Pakistan was doing just enough and because Washington did not want Musharraf to fail; it did not push Pakistan to the limits.

The thesis of Hathaway is supportive of one my claims; which is that the United States’ policies have had to do with further radicalizing of Pakistan in its war on terror. However, I disagree with him that it did not have leverage over Pakistan in pushing it to get tougher on terrorism. The author disregards the history of Pakistan’s ties with terror networks in general and the Taliban in particular in drawing this conclusion. In the immediate aftermath of the invasion of Afghanistan, all Taliban and some Al Qaeda leaders took refuge in Pakistan and the United States failed to hold Pakistan responsible. In short, the author’s analysis falls short of proving his latter point.

6) Haqqani, H. (2005). Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

 Hussain Haqqani argues that the duality in Pakistani policy—supporting selective militant groups in Kashmir and Afghanistan while seeking American and international support—as a practice has a history behind it. Through a historical analysis, he insists that this is not a new phenomenon; rather Pakistan’s dual policy can be traced back to the 1950’s. According to Haqqani, the elements that have shaped this policy are Pakistan’s confrontation with India, its embrace of religious nationalism, and desire to maintain American economic and military support. He explains how Pakistani politics led to a merger between Pakistani nationalism and Islam. He argues that because the division between Pakistan and India was based on the notion of having a separate territory for the Muslim population of the subcontinent, Pakistan upon its inception, had to identify its statehood with Islamic ideology since the population was ethnically diverse. Therefore, he maintains, Pakistani politicians sought to unify the independent state under the banner of Islam in the face of “Hindu India.”

The author also refutes that Pakistani politics were radicalized under Zia ul-Haq or that Zia was responsible for merging the military with radical Islamists. Instead, according to Haqqani, Zia simply continued the policies of the past in defining Pakistan as an Islamic state. In the process, however, Zia did go the farthest in nurturing a jihadist ideology. Most of the author’s evidence comes from secondary sources—government document, academic literature and etc.—while some of it consists of primary sources such excerpts from interviews. He supports the bulk of his argument with historical analysis and references.

This source provides paramount evidence and reasons for my claim that Pakistan’s military and intelligence services are heavily involved in the insurgency campaign in Afghanistan. It also gives me a historical context of Pakistan’s foreign policy.

7) Haqqani, H. (2004). The Role of Islam in Pakistan’s Future. Washington Quarterly, 28 (1), 85-96. Retrieved October 15, 2009, from Academic Search Complete.  

The author’s thesis is that Pakistan has not and will not give up on its long-standing ties with radical Islam. According to Haqqani, Islam will remain a significant factor in Pakistan’s politics for the foreseeable future. The author rebuffs the assumption that because Pakistan has cooperated with the United States in the war against terrorism, Pakistan will likely give up on supporting radical groups in Pakistan. Furthermore, that the U.S.’s support for Pakistan’s military has encouraged the military’s political ambitions and thus has compromised change in Pakistan. The author also maintains that Musharraf’s policies helped increase the political power of radical groups in the immediate aftermath of his military coup and has used Islamists for political purposes since then.

This argument is good evidence for my claim that there’s a strong connection between radicals and Pakistan’s military. Also, that Pakistan’s state is hijacked by the elites (military) whose interests are best advanced by radical Islamist ideology and groups. And this is why Pakistan’s policies towards Afghanistan have been so lethal and destructive.

8 ) Jones, O. B. (2002). Pakistan: Eye of the Storm. New Haven: Yale University Press

According to the author, Pakistan’s sense of insecurity and vulnerability has always forced it to align itself with other big powers and oftentimes the U.S. has played that role. But their relationship has not been consistent because of the United States’ on and off desire and self interest to partner with Pakistan. The author argues that the West’s perception of Pakistan as a terrorism exporting state is tainted with prejudices. He maintains that there are other deep factors the West needs to be considerate of. Those include, the Kashmir dispute, Pakistan’s relations with India (and the U.S.), and Pakistan’s struggle with defining the role of Islam in the state. 

Jones also argues that radicalization of Pakistan was the result of Zia’s policies during the war against the Soviet occupation in Afghanistan. Unlike other authors, he insists that Zia, the third military ruler of Pakistan, in partnering Pakistan with the U.S., Islamized Pakistan; and that legacy still haunts Pakistan.

According to Jones, the current (former now) President, General Musharraf, is on a mission of dismantling that legacy. But, he insists, it will not be easy. And the implication of his success and failure in this task will have consequences beyond the borders of Pakistan.

This source will be helpful to me explaining and understanding the developments in and reaction of Pakistan in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 and the country’s overnight transformation into an ally in the war on terror.

9) Rashid, A. (2008). Descent into Chaos, The United States and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia. New York: Viking.

Ahmed Rashid’s thesis is how the United States failed to—both before and after (more so after) invading Afghanistan—rebuild that country. His critique of the policies of the United States in the aftermath of 9/11 and its conduct of the war on terror are geared towards explaining how and why the region as a whole spiraled into the chaos it finds itself in. The author argues that the chaotic situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan’s tendency to support the insurgency in Afghanistan could have been prevented if the U.S-led NATO mission had been well resourced and committed to rebuilding Afghanistan from the time of the invasion in 2001. 

The author emphasizes that the biggest factor in Pakistan’s Afghan policies is India and its influence in Afghanistan. Pakistan, according to him, always had a vested interest in keeping friendly governments in Afghanistan and therefore balancing the Pakistani- Indian rivalry in the region could result in Pakistani policies that are less antagonistic towards Afghanistan. Rashid draws his analysis through a chronology of events since the beginning of the war on terror.

The author’s background positions him very well to draw these conclusions. He had been a witness—as a journalist in Afghanistan—to what resulted from the abandonment of that country after the Soviets left. His work will be useful to me in that it specifies the policies of Pakistan and the U.S. that resulted in the present situation.

10) Rashid, A. (2000). Taliban. New Haven: Yale University Press.

The author in this book describes the process by which the Taliban came to power in Afghanistan. Through a historical analysis of the country, its culture, and relationship with the outside world and Pakistan, Rashid brings together the elements that led to the formation and empowerment of the Taliban. Accordin to him, because Afghanistan was left in the hands of Pakistan after the Soviet defeat in 1980’s, the former sought to instill a pro-Pakistani government in Afghanistan. But since the fight among factional groups in the country did not allow for that to take place, Pakistan’s alternative became the Taliban movement.

But Pakistan was not the only source of assembling the Taliban, argues Rashid. Because of the jihadist ideologies and leadership from the Soviet era, Arabs, in particular Saudi Arabia—with the aim of countering Iran—jumped on the opportunity and helped in the formation of the radical movement. According to the author, Central Asian politics, Iranian-Pakistani religious rivalry, oil companies’ competition for the construction of pipelines in Afghanistan, and America’s neglect of the country played a combined role in the Taliban’s movement. The author draws on his journalistic work and secondary sources in supporting his evidence.

Rashid’s book will be most useful to in backing my claim of Pakistan’s muddling in Afghanistan. The empowerment of the Taliban made Afghanistan a client state of Pakistan. The latter’s spy agencies and military almost conducted the brutal civil in Afghanistan from 1996 until 2001.

11) Tellis, A. J. (2008). Pakistan’s Record on Terrorism: Conflicted Goals, Compromised Performance. Washington Quarterly, 31 (2), 7-32. Retrieved October 15, 2009, from Academic Search Premiere database.

The author argues for an analytical understanding of the problems associated with Pakistani performance in the fight against terrorism. According to her, we have not yet understood Pakistan’s approach to counterterrorism. She argues that Pakistan has approached the fight in four parts: first; it has targeted domestic sectarian groups (those engaged in domestic violence), second; it has identified the groups that were involved in terrorism against India in Kashmir and have kept them protected, third and fourth; it has distinguished between the Taliban and Al Qaeda (after they were toppled) and have given shelter to the Taliban while turning over Al Qaeda figures to the U.S.

According to the author, without understanding these complex distinctions Pakistan has made, we cannot understand Pakistan’s struggle. She further holds that Pakistan is faced with other categorical problems such Motivational, Institutional, Societal and Operational Challenges. 

The second part of the author’s argument is that once we have understood this complexity, our policy (U.S.) should consist of the following. Convince the elites of Pakistan to end their support for all groups, clarify our position and end “praise in public, pressure in private”, demand that Pakistan step up its military operations, and better train/equip Pakistani military. The author’s sources draws from secondary sources.

This work will inform my project in regard to what policy should the policy of Unite States be towards Pakistan. Although, the author does not propose sweeping changes in United States’-Pakistan policy, her argument is still relevant to how we should approach Pakistan.

12) Weinbaum, M. G., & Harder, J. B. (March, 2008). Pakistan’s Afghan policies and their consequences. Contemporary South Asia, 16 (1), 25-38. Retrieved September 16, 2009, from Academic Search Premiere database.

This article outlines the main issues between Afghanistan and Pakistan that have played out in their relationship. The focus, however, is one sided—on Pakistan. The authors identify the elements—among others, desire for expansion in the region, and countering Pahston nationalism—that have shaped Pakistan’s Afghan policies over the last four decades.

The authors argue that Pakistan’s policies have always been shortsighted in that their consequences for Afghanistan have been catastrophic (civil war, instability and isolation from the rest of the world). They also argue that Pakistan’s policies have had adverse effect on Pakistan itself.

This work is further evidence for my claim of Pakistan’s aggressive pursuit in keeping Afghanistan as a client state and how that hasn’t worked so well.

13) Weaver, M. A. (2002). Pakistan: In the shadow of Jihad and Afghanistan. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

The author argued (in 2002) how and why Pakistan could become the first failed state with nuclear arms. The repercussions, according to the author, of that will be devastating. She attributes the ills of Pakistan—militancy, extremism, and even Pakistan’s testing of a nuclear bomb—to the country’s heavy involvement in the war in Afghanistan and subsequent American policies towards Pakistan. Weaver illustrates the effects of the Jihad against the Soviets in Afghanistan has had on Pakistan. She argues that the current state of Pakistan is one of a chaos and if not dealt with, will lead to an even greater instability.

The author’s sources consist of her discussions with prime ministers, presidents, generals in the army, and even leaders of religious schools who are open in their loyalty to Al Qaeda.

This book provides me with good insights into the thinking process of the Pakistani leadership and whether or not the political situation of both Pakistan and Afghanistan is consistent with what they perceive. I don’t agree with her reasoning in regard to the effects of the war in Afghanistan on Pakistan. Her analysis is tainted with a bias in that she doesn’t discuss Pakistan’s objectives and goals in Afghanistan and how it has pursued them over the years. However, her criticism of American policy towards Pakistan may be useful in my analysis of American and Pakistani partnership.

I propose to examine Pakistan’s policy towards Afghanistan because I want to understand why Pakistan is supporting the insurgency in Afghanistan and allow its territory to shelter the leadership of Al Qaeda. Since 9/11, Pakistan has pursued a double-track policy with regard to Afghanistan, where it has expressed support for the United States-led efforts to rebuild Afghanistan, fight extremism, and persuade the Taliban to join the government; while maintaining ties with and aiding proxies that are part of the insurgency in Afghanistan. Given Pakistan’s goals of countering India’s influence in Afghanistan, attracting diplomatic and economic assistance, and the desire to keep Afghanistan “as an asset in providing strategic depth in the event of a wide conflict with India,”[1] it has aggressively sought to keep friendly governments in Afghanistan. Historically, Pakistan has gone as far risking retaliation from another power (Soviet Union in 1980’s) and criticism for its support of an oppressive regime (the Taliban) in achieving these goals. The consequences of Pakistan’s Afghan policy have been disastrous for Afghanistan, the international community’s efforts to stabilize Afghanistan, and, arguably, Pakistan itself. However, my project will begin with the examination of Pakistan’s foreign policy and its relations with Afghanistan.

First, I will explore the various models of International Relations—Realism, Global society, and Marxism[2]—that explain the behavior of a state, its interaction with other states, and events that shape its foreign policy. Applying the principles of one of these models, I will facilitate a general understanding of the basis of Pakistan’s foreign policy and identify the factors that play into the formation of that policy. Second, I will conduct a research on the history of Pakistan-Afghanistan relations and identify contentious issues between the two countries. In this context, I’ll specifically investigate how the phenomena of Cold War, Pakistan-Indian rivalry, and the political and geographic make of the region, have shaped Pakistan’s Afghan policies and analyze what those policies resulted in.

I will then focus on Pakistan’s Afghan polices since the events of 9/11 and the relationship it established with the United States in fighting the war against Terrorism. I will examine how that relationship has played out with respect to stabilizing post-Taliban Afghanistan and rooting out extremism. I will examine agreements between governments, policy documents, officials’ testimonial statements, and academic literature that critiqued Pakistan’s post-9/11 partnership with the United States, to analyze the development of the double-track policy. In doing so, I want to find out why Pakistan drifted from its original stand in fighting the Taliban, what caused that drift, and what was the process.

I will also address the criticism that Afghanistan’s problems and instability has to do solely with the country’s ethnic make up, history of violence, and ultra-orthodox view of religion and tradition. And that Pakistan’s policies, by virtue of its cultural commonalities with the Afghan population, have always been geared towards helping Afghanistan. Moreover, that Pakistan’s dealings with militants in its border areas—where the leadership of Al Qaeda is suspected to be based—have not contributed to the sophistication and escalation of the insurgency in Afghanistan in recent years.   

This project will conclude with a light assessment of the newly designed (currently under debate) strategy of the United States in Afghanistan. In light of the focus of the project, the then implemented strategy will be assessed with respect to Pakistan’s Afghan policies and the prospects of its success will be examined. 

 

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[1] Weinbaum, Marvin G. “Pakistan’s Afghan Policies and their Consequences.” Contemporary South Asia Mar 2008: Vol. 16 Issue 1, p25-38, 14p

[2] Ikenberry, G. John. American Foreign Policy: Theoretical Essay. New York: Princeton University, 2005

Nor Powanda
Professor Quinby
September 9, 2009
Autobiographical Statement

I was born in Ghazni, a province in Southeastern Afghanistan. The political upheavals and bloody Civil War in that country, especially during the latter part of the 1990’s were part of my early childhood. I was witness to the political process under which the country slipped into the hands of those with a governing philosophy that not only isolated the country from the rest of the world, but also—with the intentions and interests of others—used the territory of the state to plan and execute the most lethal acts of terrorism in recent memory.

My family lived in a village setting and that’s where I grew up. Since schools were located in cities, we had to commute long distances to attend school. For this reason we did not have the opportunity of doing so until teen years, when we could either commute by ourselves or able to cover long distances on foot. As a result, the source of our learning during early childhood was the local mosque where the academic curriculum consisted of basic religious studies. Before migrating to Pakistan in my early teens, I had had the chance of completing 1^st and 2^nd grades.

Because the United States did not have diplomatic relations with Afghanistan, the process of immigrating to the U.S. had to be done through another country, in our case Pakistan, where there was an American Consulate and Embassy. Therefore, those family members, including myself, who were bound to come to the U.S, migrated to Pakistan where we resided in the city of Quetta until 2002, the year we came to the United States. Since arriving here, I have continuously attended school, completing 4-years of high school and 3-years of college—with the fourth year being in progress now. My studies in college have centered on Political Science without a concentration in any specific subfield. I’ve also minored in the study of Journalism and hope to study International Law upon completing my undergraduate studies.

Since leaving Afghanistan I have been back there once. However, I have immediate and extended family members scattered all across the country who keeps me updated through means of communications on the overall situation of the country and the circumstances of their daily lives. Additionally, I’ve paid close attention to the media, both Western and non-Western, in following the conflict in my home country.

My interest in politics—both theoretically and the application of political theories to societal as well as international problems—and my experience, on an extremely personal and intimate level, with the conflict in Afghanistan have led to my inspiration of exploring that conflict with a focus on Pakistan, the neighboring country that is heavily involved in Afghanistan. That involvement has had, and continues to have, catastrophic consequences for the West’s efforts to stabilize Afghanistan and prevent it from becoming a battle ground for international terrorism.

The conflict in Afghanistan is becoming a major concern for the international community, especially the U.S.-led NATO mission there, as well as many Afghans. There is a consensus among military and political analysts that NATO needs more troops and resources to win the war and that the burden of providing more troops could fall on the United States alone. Discontent with that war is growing among NATO allies. Even worse, some people want a complete withdrawal of NATO forces after eight long years of war with close to nothing gained. Afghanistan has become an issue in many circles including governments, academics and policy makers, both here at home and abroad. Given the lessons of history, will the United States’ adventures in Afghanistan conclude in the same way as those of the British and Soviets in the 19^th and 20^th centuries? If so, what will be the consequences; not just for world, but, and especially for Afghanistan? Should the United States send more troops there?

 

These are questions I see debated between relatives over dinner tables, people in their work places, and Afghans of all walks of life on daily bases. Furthermore, these are the questions I see academics, military leaders, congressmen and even the President of the United States struggle with. In light of this assessment, I see the readers of my project across the board.

 

Given the range of these questions and the current situation of the Afghan war, my focus in this project, however, will not be on answering these stated questions specifically. Instead, my focus will be on how and why the West’s efforts in stabilizing Afghanistan have failed. Under that heading, I intend to explore the role of Pakistan in undermining the efforts of the international community to bring stability to Afghanistan. Furthermore, my emphasis will be on the United States’ relationship with Pakistan and how its policies towards Pakistan have contributed to Pakistan’s intentions of destabilizing Afghanistan. I will also inquire into how Pakistan— one of just 3 countries in world that not only maintained diplomatic ties with Afghanistan under the Taliban, but also orchestrated the movement that produced the Taliban–is carrying out the double standard strategy of both compromising the West’s efforts to succeed in Afghanistan and yet is able to convince the world that it is helping those efforts.

 

Some of the specification questions are:

1)      What is the United States’ and its allies mission in Afghanistan, and why are they still there after 8 years?

2)      How has the Afghan war become a regional issue over the last few years? Why did it become a regional issue?

3)      What exactly are Pakistan’s interests in Afghanistan? How is Pakistan working towards those interests?

4)      How should the United States deal with Pakistan over its support for al Qaeda? Why is Pakistan allowed to harbor and even support proxies in Afghanistan to destabilize that country?

5)      The organization that planned and carried out the 9/11 attacks is now based in Pakistan, why doesn’t the West take military action against Pakistan?

6)      Who exactly is NATO fighting in Afghanistan?

7)      How can other power regional powers including India, China, and Russia contribute to stabilizing Afghanistan? Is that even possible?