Foucault and the Genealogy of Pastoral Power

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Review of:


All significant concepts of the modern theory of the state are secularized theological concepts not only because of their historical development — in which they were transferred from theology to the theory of the state, whereby, for example, the omnipotent God became the omnipotent lawgiver — but also because of their systematic structure, the recognition of which is necessary for a sociological consideration of these concepts.

— Carl Schmitt, Political Theology

Every year, from his election to the position of Professor of the Collège de France in 1970 until 1982, Michel Foucault delivered a course of lectures open to the general public (with the exception of a 1977 sabbatical). The express intention of these lecture courses was for Collège Professors to “report” on the progress of their current research projects. As a result, the published lecture courses exhibit a certain experimental, pleasingly unfinished quality; what we read is Foucault submitting to a room of budding acolytes the tentative conclusions and seductive hypotheses of
a “work in progress.” There are thus, as one commentator on the lectures observes, “references to current world events, to books that have recently come into print, and even to headlines from the morning’s newspaper.”¹ The full series of lecture courses given by Foucault spans the seeming decline of his “archaeological” method in the early 1970s, the development of his better-known “genealogical” investigations in the middle to late 1970s, and finally his interrogation into the 1980s of the constitution of subjectivity via the texts of ancient antiquity and early Christianity.

Putting aside for a moment certain ethical considerations pertaining to the use of this serendipitous Nachlass,² the lecture courses evidently constitute an invaluable resource for Foucault scholars. They are interesting and useful not simply for their immediacy and the breadth of their combined “coverage,” but also for the fact that they allow us to map and to explain shifts in Foucault’s theoretical positions and methodologies in the putative “silence” between his published monographs. Frequently they supplement and contextualize some of the better-known formulations which appear in the books, lectures and interviews; and, more interestingly, in places they present examples of Foucault revising or contradicting some of the views expressed in his published work.³ As a result, those lecture courses which have now been published have generated significant academic interest — indeed, one recently published monograph on Foucault takes the lecture courses as a point of departure and deploys them as a means to re-interpret Foucault’s work.⁴ To date, five lecture courses have been translated from French into English: *Abnormal* (1974–75), “Society Must be Defended” (1975–76), *The Hermeneutics of the Subject* (1981–82), *Psychiatric Power* (1973–74), and most recently *Security, Territory, Population* (1977–78).

My consideration of this last and very welcome addition to Foucault’s posthumously expanding oeuvre proceeds in two parts. In the first, I offer a summary

and exegesis of Foucault’s arguments in Security, Territory, Population. In so doing, I aim to contextualize central themes of the lecture course by relating them to approaches taken up and jettisoned in succeeding work, and by linking them to the general trajectory of Foucault’s thought as a whole (as given expression in his published writings). In the second, I propose an interpretation of the lecture course, a reading of the course as a contribution to the critique of the theological basis of modern state power. I argue that this genealogical discussion of the historical development of the Christian pastorate and its gradual assimilation into modern state apparatuses constitutes a peculiarly Foucaultian approach to the problematic of the state, both because it takes as its primary focus the technologies and modalities of power (first developed in a Christian context) and because, in the course of so doing, Foucault foregrounds the possibilities of resistance to, and within, this pastoral-cum-“secular” modality of state power.

I. The Lecture Course for 1977–78

Situating the Course

The thirteen lectures given by Foucault for the academic year of 1977–78 ran from January 11, 1978 until April 5, 1978. In terms of the chronology of his annual courses at the Collège de France, Security, Territory, Population (hereafter, “STP”) thus falls between “Society Must be Defended” and The Birth of Biopolitics (published in French in 2004 and to be released in English shortly). “Society Must be Defended” proposed a genealogy of the emergence of what Foucault termed “the first historico-political discourse on society.”5 This discourse, found in England in the writings of thinkers such as Coke or Lilburne, and in France in the work of the aristocratic historian Henri de Boullainvilliers, utilized the concept of war as a grid of intelligibility for power relations in society. In “Society Must be Defended”, Foucault traced the development of this discourse, with its various deployments and reworkings, up through the twentieth century to the emergence of a discourse of biologized state racism. Particularly in its concluding discussion of bio-power, there is noticeable overlap with several central concerns from The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1, and we can see Foucault in this period moving beyond the analysis of social relations in terms of institutional mechanisms of discipline to a wider, or more “macrosocial,” analysis of bio-power.

The thematic of bio-power is of course taken up in STP, although as we shall see it is very quickly subordinated to the more precise investigation of “governmentality” and apparatuses of security. This downgrading of the explicit theme of the bio-

5. Foucault, “Society Must be Defended”, p. 49.
political is again practiced in the lecture course immediately postdating *STP*. In *The Birth of Biopolitics*, Foucault moves beyond the titular concern with bio-politics to the real subject of the lecture course, “liberalism,” understood in genealogical terms neither as a theory nor as an ideology, but rather as a practice, or as what Foucault might term a political technology (he looks specifically at two variants of twentieth-century liberal thought: German Ordo-liberalism and the Chicago school of neo-liberal economics). STP is thus located at that point in Foucault’s researches where, having taken up the theme of bio-politics as a means of extending his earlier analyses of discipline (and there are several revisionary comments in *STP* to the effect that the concept of discipline does not suffice to explain power’s operation in modernity), he yet realizes that the notion needs supplementing and reworking — first in the direction of “governmentality” and apparatuses of security, and then later of liberalism as a political technology. Indeed, one of the things which arises from a reading of *STP* is the fact that, despite its popularization by contemporary writers such as Giorgio Agamben, the theme of bio-politics or the bio-political is really not developed as a stand-alone notion at any great length by Foucault.

*STP* may also be situated in relation to some of Foucault’s better known books of this period, coming between the publication of the first volume of the *History of Sexuality* project (in 1976) and the somewhat delayed publication of the theoretically reformulated second and third volumes of the series (both published in 1984). The lectures are thus delivered at the beginning of one of those commonly remarked monographic “silences” (a somewhat loquacious “silence,” it must be observed, which is punctuated by manifold lectures, interviews and journalistic interventions) wherein Foucault, as Beatrice Han notes, “seems to have abandoned, or reexamined

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8. While Foucault explicitly discusses bio-power in the final chapter and lecture of, respectively, *The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1* and “Society Must be Defended”, as well as in some lectures and interviews at this time, he nevertheless does not fully thematize it. I would argue that this is because the concept is a relatively broad and amorphous one, and that (contra Timothy O’Leary, who argues that bio-power is “conceptually . . . included in the concept of governmentality”), Foucault went in search of more historically and socially refined categories, of which governmentality and apparatuses of security represent the first examples. See Timothy O’Leary, *Foucault: The Art of Ethics* (New York: Continuum, 2002), p. 178.
and reformed, his previous methods.”  

9. STP is situated at the commencement of the particular hiatus that sees Foucault not only downgrade his favored genealogical methodology of the 1970s but also re-examine his prior positions on subjectivity. As he came later to observe, in one of his numerous retrospective self-assessments:

Perhaps I’ve insisted too much on the technology of domination and power. I am more and more interested in the interaction between oneself and others, and in the technologies of individual domination, in the mode of action that an individual exercises upon himself by means of the technologies of the self.  

10. Now, as Foucault scholars routinely acknowledge, the somewhat crude tripartite categorization of his work into the archaeological, the genealogical and the ethical (or, the constitution of subjectivity) phases elides subtle variations within these approaches, not to mention their possible inter-relation and/or complementarity.  


12. It is thus the meeting point of Foucault’s well-known concerns of the mid-1970s and his later thematization of ethics. Moreover, there is discernible (for example, towards the end of the seventh lecture) the beginnings of an investigation of the Christian renunciatory hermeneutic of the self, which forms a parallel concern, and an exemplary counterpoint, to Foucault’s late rehabilitation of

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11. For example, see the classic text by Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), pp. 104–6. And of course Foucault claims both archaeological and genealogical status for his late work on ethics and critique; see, for example, Michel Foucault, “What is Enlightenment?”, trans. Catherine Porter (amended by Robert Hurley), in Essential Works of Foucault, Vol 1: Ethics, pp. 315, 319.

pagan ethics and its contemporary redeployment as an aesthetics of existence. So, in placing STP within Foucault’s intellectual trajectory we can see not only a branching out from earlier disciplinary analyses (via the somewhat attenuated theoretical consideration of bio-politics) but also the indication of an incipient interest in the government of the self, which will come to form the basis of his explicit consideration of ethics in the early 1980s.

The Course Material

STP traces the historical rise of the Christian pastorate as a technology of power and describes its eventual transposition and transformation into the “secular” statist doctrine of the raison d’État in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Europe. This is the aspect of the lecture course upon which I focus in greater depth, below. However, Foucault begins in the first three lectures by elucidating historiographical and methodological questions.

Foucault’s principal concern in the first three lectures is to articulate the specificity of apparatuses of security and, more importantly, to distinguish them from the concept of discipline which he had developed in the preceding years. According to Foucault, what defines a mechanism of security is neither that it prohibits (per law) nor that it prescribes (per discipline) but rather that it, “possibly making use of some instruments of prescription and prohibition … respond[s] to a reality in such a way that this response cancels out the reality to which it responds — nullifies it, or limits, checks, or regulates it” (p. 47). We begin to see here, and this signals Foucault’s specific interest with modalities of liberalism pursued the following year in The Birth of Biopolitics, that apparatuses of security “work” by “laissez faire” means and rely upon a statistical knowledge which takes the population as


14. Compare the first two lectures of “Society Must be Defended”, pp. 1–41.

15. As the editorial notes to STP inform us (p. 24), Foucault does distinguish security mechanisms from disciplinary mechanisms in the final lecture of “Society Must be Defended” (p. 246), but the concept of mechanisms of security is absent from The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1. It is thus in this lecture course that the distinction is made in its clearest and most comprehensive terms.
its object. As Foucault puts it neatly, apparatuses of security function to induce “a progressive self-cancellation of phenomena by the phenomena themselves. In a way, they involve the delimitation of phenomena within acceptable limits, rather than the imposition of a law [or a disciplinary norm]” (p. 66).16

So, to take one of Foucault’s examples from the third lecture, while a disciplinary approach to the problem of disease might entail treating the sick and preventing contagion among the wider population by forcibly isolating cases of infection, an approach utilizing apparatuses of security would assume a very different aspect. First, employing statistics, it would seek to calculate the normal expectation, among the population as a whole, of being affected by the disease or of dying from it. Next, it would try to isolate different “normalities” within different constituencies of the population. For example, there might be a higher normal rate of morbidity or mortality among the inhabitants of certain towns, or of different regions, or among those of a certain age or working in a certain profession, and so forth. A security-based approach to disease management would thus aim to isolate the immanent regularities of the phenomenon of disease within the population taken as a whole, next to break down this overall norm into its constituent elements, and then, finally, to manage the interplay of the different normalities in order to achieve an optimum result. This might involve, for example, specific tailored interventions to arrest the spread of disease in certain areas, or it could involve leaving other areas or groups untreated. As Foucault observes in the course of discussing another example, the circulation of grain and the economic problem of scarcity, apparatuses of security might function by “allowing prices to rise, allowing scarcity to develop, and letting people go hungry so as to prevent something else happening, namely the introduction

16. Foucault now makes a point of distinguishing “normation” from “normalization.” The former process is said to characterize the operation of disciplinary mechanisms, in which “there is an originally prescriptive character of the norm and the determination and the identification of the normal and the abnormal becomes possible in relation to this posited norm” (STP, p. 57). The latter process is said to characterize the operation of security mechanisms and reverses the priority, or at any rate the chronology, of norm and normal. In this process of “normalization,” Foucault argues, different immanent normalities are observed within the population as a whole and a norm is fixed on the basis of these normalities: “The norm is an interplay of differential normalities. The normal comes first and the norm is deduced from it” (STP, p. 63). It seems strange for Foucault, of all people, to argue that the norm could be either simply posited or unproblematically derived from social facts when in fact what distinguished Foucault’s earlier deployment of the term was its very uncertain ontological status; recall for example his discussion of the norm as “a regularity that is also a rule” in Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1991), p. 179. A hybrid creature of law and fact, neither pure “ought” nor pure “is,” the constituent irresolution of the norm was surely always both less and more than this positivist separation would seemingly allow.
of the general scourge of scarcity” (p. 45). So, as against discipline’s interventionist regulation, apparatuses of security practice a laissez-faire and technocratic management of phenomena at the level of population itself.

At this stage it becomes evident that the crucial object upon which apparatuses of security operate, and which had to be constituted in the realm of political knowledge in order for security apparatuses to function, is precisely this notion of population. Population is not conceived of as a collection of individual juridical subjects within a determinate territory. Rather, population has a life and a specific density of its own, to which the techniques of security must adapt themselves and upon which they must begin to operate: “It is a set of elements in which we can note constants and regularities even in accidents . . . and with regard to which we can identify a number of modifiable variables on which it depends” (p. 74). So, Foucault draws a distinction between an old notion of government centered upon the actions of a sovereign ruling his territorial subjects through laws and edicts, to a new notion of the “art of government,” first discernible in the writings of certain political theorists of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, in which the notion of population replaces the concept of a collection of subjects and the statistical management of variables becomes the primary technique of governance. Foucault clarifies the link between what he has been calling apparatuses of security and what he now, in the fourth lecture,

17. The letting of some suffer in order to ensure the survival of others is discussed elsewhere in this lecture much more explicitly in terms of a letting die: “and it may well be that some people die of hunger after all. But by letting these people die of hunger one will be able to make scarcity a chimera and prevent it occurring in this massive form of the scourge typical of the previous systems. . . . [T]he death of individuals not only does not disappear, it must not disappear” (STP, p. 42). This discussion obviously mirrors Foucault’s discussion, in the final lecture of “Society Must be Defended”, of how “[o]nce the State functions in the bio-power mode, racism alone can justify the murderous function of the State” (see Foucault, “Society Must be Defined”, p. 256). Here, in STP, Foucault’s analysis is framed not in terms of race and the caesura that race opens up within the body politic (allowing “others” to be killed so that some, “we”, may live), but rather in terms of a caesura between the “pertinent” level of the population (which is the object of government management and control) and the merely “instrumental” level of the individual who, accordingly, can be sacrificed (STP, p. 42). This formulation recalls Mussolini’s joint entry, with Giovanni Gentile, in the 1932 Enciclopedia italiana on “Fascismo”: “Anti-individualistic, the Fascist conception of power is for the State; and it is for the individual only in so far as his interests coincide with those of the State” (quoted in Paul Ginsborg, “In the Shadow of Berlusconi,” New York Review of Books, Volume 54, no. 1 (2007), p. 50, emphasis in original). To my mind, the notion of racism introduced in “Society Must Be Defended”, and then promptly discontinued as a serious thematic in Foucault’s work, represents a more analytically useful (and politically cogent) means for thinking about this notion of the sacrifice of individuals to a wider collectivity (population, society, nation, and so forth) than does the double of population–individual. On this point, see also Giorgio Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive, trans. by Daniel Heller-Roazen (New York: Zone Books, 2002), pp. 82–86.
introduces as “governmentality” — population is the “target,” the political object of this new modality of power called governmentality, while apparatuses of security are its “essential technical instrument,” the technical means by which population is managed (p. 108). We thus have the series: “security—population—government” (p. 88), as opposed to, say, “discipline—subjects—territorial sovereignty.” So, having distinguished the notion of an apparatus of security from his previous conceptualization of disciplinary power, and having articulated apparatuses of security with the concept of “governmentality” for which they serve as a technique, Foucault then begins what he calls a “history of ‘governmentality’” (p. 108). And for this, which is really the abiding preoccupation of the course, he returns (as he will many times in the future) to ancient antiquity. Thus, the impelling historical narrative of the course really begins in the fifth lecture.

Foucault surmises that the historical foundations of present practices of state-based governmentality (the idea of the “government of men” as opposed to the Machiavellian retention of territorial sovereignty) are partly to be found in the pre-Christian East, and then later in the Christian East, in the model and organization of a pastoral type of power. Pastoral power was, Foucault tells us, characterized in the following way: first, it was exercised over a flock of people on the move rather than over a static territory; secondly, it was a fundamentally beneficent power according to which the duty of the pastor (to the point of self-sacrifice) was the salvation of the flock; and finally, it was an individualizing power, in that the pastor must care for each and every member of the flock singly (see pp. 125–30). This last characteristic, Foucault observes, gives rise to what he calls the “paradox of the shepherd,” namely that because the pastor must care for the multiplicity as a whole while at the same time providing for the particular salvation of each (omnes et singulatim), there must necessarily be both a “sacrifice of one for all, and the sacrifice of all for one, which will be at the absolute heart of the Christian problematic of the pastorate” (p. 129).

As Foucault indicates here, this paradoxical sacrificial logic of the pastoral form of power ultimately reaches its fullest elaboration with the institutionalization of the pastoral modality of power in the (Western) Christian pastorate: “Given this, in the Western world I think the real history of the pastorate as the source of a specific type of power over men, as a model and matrix of procedures for the government of men, really only begins with Christianity” (pp. 147–48). Importantly, despite the many strategic reversals and contestations over this form of power, the history of the pastorate as a technology of power is a history from which Western modernity, despite its secular pretensions, has by no means emerged. Foucault seeks to emphasize both the continuities and discontinuities amongst and between three different historical forms of the pastorate: the Hebraic/Eastern form of pastoral-
ism; the Christian pastorate; and forms of Western state-based governmentality operative from around the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. While the Christian Church appropriates and re-orientates earlier forms of the pastoral, the Church in its turn serves as the historical “background” (p. 165) to the governmentality of the early modern period (which in turn informs contemporary formations).

Before proposing an interpretation of the course as a whole and an analysis of its distinctive contribution, I want to finish my summation by briefly examining two questions: first, what characterized the institutionalized Christian pastorate; and, secondly, how and into what did it transform itself on the “threshold of the modern state” (p. 165)?

In the seventh lecture of the course, Foucault explains what constitutes the “specificity of the Christian pastorate” (p. 167). In addition to the general aspects of pastoral power discussed above, the pastorate is characterized by the following elements: first, the principle of “analytical responsibility,” according to which the pastor must account for “every act of each of his sheep, for everything that may have happened between them, and everything good and evil they may have done at any time”; secondly, the principle of “exhaustive and instantaneous transfer,” according to which the merits and demerits of each individual sheep are imputed to the pastor; thirdly, the principle of “sacrificial reversal,” under which the pastor must be prepared to sacrifice himself in order to save his sheep; and finally, the principle of “alternate correspondence,” according to which the merits of the sheep, and their prospects of salvation, are increased in inverse proportion to the failings of their pastor, and in turn the pastor rises in the eyes of the Lord (and will assure his own salvation) if he has struggled with a recalcitrant flock (pp. 170–72). We can see, then, that there is a complex reciprocity here that binds the pastor and his sheep, with the

18. The notion of a threshold of modernity is a recurrent (yet changing) theme in Foucault’s work. For example, we see in The Order of Things that “the threshold that separates us from Classical thought and constitutes our modernity” is rendered by Foucault in epistemological terms, being of course the dissolution of the Classical episteme centered upon representation; see Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences (New York: Vintage Books, 1970), p. xxiv. When genealogy replaces archaeology as Foucault’s preferred methodology, we find a different explanation rendered this time in terms of technologies of power. Compare Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1, p. 143: “But what might be called a society’s ‘threshold of modernity’ has been reached when the life of the species is wagered on its own political strategies.” Here governmentality replaces the bio-political as the index of the modern. When, finally, modernity is rendered neither as a temporal event nor as a set of features proper to an era, but rather as an “attitude” that one takes towards the present, the thematic of the threshold and its relationship to modernity becomes reversed and thence reformulated as a question of how, if one is adopting a “modern” attitude, one works critically upon one’s limits (or thresholds) in order to go beyond them, to become otherwise than one is, and so forth. See Foucault, “What is Enlightenment?”, pp. 309, 319.
pastor exercising a precise and meticulous accounting of the actions of each and all of his charges in order to assure their salvation. As Foucault observes, “[t]he pastor must really take charge of and observe daily life in order to form a never-ending knowledge of the behavior and conduct of the members of the flock he supervises” (p. 181). The pastor’s concern with the minutiae of the quotidian must also extend to the “spiritual direction” [direction de conscience] of the thoughts of his flock — a procedure which involves the production and extraction of “a truth which binds one to the person who directs one’s conscience” (p. 183). Foucault illustrates a model of power, then, in which there is a complex (and thoroughly affective) tie between the pastor who exercises a minute and careful jurisdiction over the bodily actions and the souls of his flock in order to assure their salvation, and the members of the flock who each owe him “a kind of exhaustive, total, and permanent relationship of individual obedience” (p. 183). The pastorate thus revolves around the notions of salvation, obedience and truth.

Let me now conclude this section with a brief answer to my second question of how the Christian pastorate, that “art of conducting, directing, leading, guiding, taking in hand, and manipulating men . . . collectively and individually throughout their life and at each moment of their existence” (p. 165) developed into modern forms of governmentality. Foucault is relatively clear that while the Christian pastorate forms both the “background” (p. 165) and the “prelude” (p. 184) to more recognizably modern forms of government, indeed these latter formations very much “arise on the basis” of it (p. 193), he is nevertheless not describing a “massive, comprehensive transfer of pastoral functions from Church to state” (p. 229). As Foucault explains in the ninth lecture, there are two parallel processes taking place in the sixteenth century: first, there is not a diminution of religious pastoralism but rather “an intensification of the religious pastorate in its spiritual forms . . . [and] also in its extension and temporal efficiency” (p. 229); and secondly, “we also see a development of forms of the activity of conducting men outside of ecclesiastical authority. . . . How to conduct oneself, one’s children, and one’s family?” (p. 230). This “intensification, increase, and general proliferation of this question and of these techniques of conduct” (p. 231) ultimately impinges on the question of sovereignty such that the political question then becomes: “To what extent must whoever exercises sovereignty now be responsible for the new and specific tasks of the government of men?” (p. 232). Foucault’s answer is, in short, that “[t]he sovereign is required to do more than purely and simply exercise his sovereignty,” indeed he is forced to resort to something which is both “more than sovereignty . . . [and] supplementary in relation to sovereignty” (pp. 236–37), and that something is government. This supplementary excess of government over sovereignty calls for a certain rationality according to which this government is to be exercised. So, technologies of pastoralism
multiply, overflow their hitherto strictly ecclesiastical economy, and begin to invest
the field of political sovereignty. How, then, or according to what rationality, is this
new modality of government to be exercised?

It is at this juncture that Foucault introduces the doctrine of *raison d’État*, and
through a reading in lectures nine and ten of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century
theorists of *raison d’État* such as Palazzo, Bacon, Naudé and Chemnitz (placed in
negative proximity to Machiavelli), he elucidates the circular and immanent logic of
the doctrine: “The end of *raison d’État* is the state itself, and if there is something
like perfection, happiness, or felicity, it will only ever be the perfection, happiness or
felicity of the state itself” (p. 258). This maintenance of the state’s forces pursuant
to this new art of government necessitates “setting up two major assemblages of
political technology” (p. 312). Accordingly, the state is placed in both an external
and an internal field: first, what is required externally is the maintenance of the
competitive equilibrium of national power in Europe (discussed in lecture eleven);
and secondly, what is deployed internally is the doctrine of police (discussed in
lecture twelve). In short, through a reading of German writers of *Polizeiwissenschaft*
such as von Justi, and French theorists of police such as Delamare and Turquet de
Mayerne, Foucault describes how this political technology of police intervenes in the
daily life of the subjects of a state in everything from the circulation of goods and
people, to the maintenance of sanitation and health, the guaranteeing of public
security and order, and the construction of infrastructure. In short, police aims at
“everything from being to well-being, everything that may produce this well-being
beyond being, and in such a way that the well-being of individuals is the state’s
strength” (p. 328). Police is the science of internal administration; it is “administrative
modernity par excellence” (p. 321).

To recap, *raison d’État* (with its internal mechanism, or assemblage, of police)
is the rationality proper to the art of government which develops in the sixteenth
century in response to the problematization of sovereignty and the need to devel-


op a governmental supplement (which is in itself a response to the question of
“conduct” raised by the Christian pastorate). Ultimately, to continue the theme of
circulation and return, Foucault “concludes” his historical discussion of the various
metamorphoses of governmentality in the thirteenth and last lecture by discussing the
dissolution of *raison d’État* and the governmentality of police through the critique
of the *économistes* in the eighteenth century. This brings him back to the discussion
of the difference between disciplinary mechanisms and mechanisms of security
pursued in the first three lectures, and we can see how the interventionist, regulatory
and disciplinary modality of power that is the police state is contested, and then
replaced, by a new governmentality which reformulates the notion of population and
deploys scientific knowledges in order to manage its object. This putative “conclusion,”
of course, is an opening onto the problematic of laissez-faire governance and the political technology of liberalism engaged in the subsequent lecture course: *The Birth of Biopolitics*.

### II. The Genealogy of Pastoral Power

With such a sweeping historical narrative it is possible, and tempting, to isolate any number of given themes. I shall here restrict myself to one, and in so doing should perhaps make clear that my chosen theme does not by any means capture the entirety of Foucault’s expansive enterprise in this lecture course. In *STP*, Foucault moves, sometimes abruptly, from a reading of ancient Greek and Hebraic sources to the texts of early modern political theory and the science of administration, by way of Christian penitential practices, heterodoxies and heresies from the third century onwards. There is thus throughout the course an intriguing conjunction of the political and the religious, and it is this particular conjunction that my reading here is focused upon. More specifically, in the reading that I pursue in the remainder of this essay, I propose to locate *STP* within a theoretical perspective which is devoted to excavating the theological roots (and, by extension, the continuing theological remnants and dynamics) of the putatively secular political institutions of modernity. In thus situating Foucault I nevertheless want to make clear how his contribution differs from other approaches to this emerging problematic. I argue that what distinguishes Foucault’s approach in this lecture course is his rigorous insistence on revealing the *historico-practical* theological grounds of modern state power. He accomplishes this through a genealogy of the different forms in which the state has “entered into the field of practice and thought” (p. 247). In making this critique, Foucault characteristically focuses upon questions of *power* and the way in which power is exercised by and upon subjects (and increasingly, in the later work, by subjects upon themselves). Just as importantly, however, he foregrounds the question of *resistance* to, and within, this pastoral-cum-state power.

In the epigraph from his aptly titled *Political Theology* with which I opened this essay, Carl Schmitt makes a distinction between two approaches to the study of the “significant concepts of the modern theory of the state.” These concepts are “secularized theological concepts,” he tells us, not simply by virtue of their theological heritage but also because of what Schmitt calls their very “systematic structure,” the analysis of which is essential to any sociological understanding of the concepts.19

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Thus, history and sociology (the latter understood somewhat formalistically by Schmitt here as the systematic functioning of concepts) are presented as two ways in which we might understand current secular formations of political modernity as being underpinned by and imbued with ideas inherited from theology (and, more specifically, Christian theology). Schmitt’s distinction does not of course exhaust the possible avenues of inquiry into the theological bases of secular modernity. In my discussion below, I look at two different contemporary approaches to this question. The first approach investigates the theological-philosophical dynamic of some of the key concepts of modern law and politics, aiming to demonstrate the (productive) failure of their claims to secular status (a failure which reveals a constitutive dependence upon notions of the sacred and upon transcendence). The second approach is the one Foucault pursues in STP and is focused upon the analysis of practices and modalities of power — more of this later.

In much of the contemporary theoretical work being carried out on what is called “secular theology” there is a focus upon the failed philosophical pretensions of secular modernism to an achieved immanence, to its having effectively banished from a profane modern existence all constituent reliance upon transcendent concepts and thus to its having expelled what Schmitt elegantly calls, in the same work, all otiose “reminiscences of theology.” The work of Peter Fitzpatrick, for example, aptly demonstrates the continuance of the sacred (albeit in an altered form) within the modern western political imaginary — how in fact “our” concepts such as sovereignty, law and nation depend upon a disavowed theological dynamic even while laying claim to secular status (the claim to being secular is a discursive condition of possibility for political action in the liberal public sphere, while the sacred/religious/theological is relegated to a private sphere of belief). In reference to the modern concept of sovereignty, for example, Fitzpatrick (following Derrida) argues convincingly that despite its claim to being “secularized or detheologized” through the denial of a transcendent point of reference, the concept of sovereignty still repeats a theological, or more precisely, an ontotheological gesture:

“So here,” says Derrida of sovereignty, “you have a concept which is in principle secularized, but for which the very secularization means the inheritance of a theological memory,” and here also we have a concept still not “put into question.” That “the value of sovereignty can be completely secularized and detheologized” is a prospect Derrida “doubts.” This, in turn, provokes the question of what is entailed in being partially “secularized or detheologized.” The short answer to such a question would be that, with modernity, sovereignty is not constituted in a transcendent reference. Rather, it is


This avenue of analysis thus focuses upon the philosophical dynamic of foundational concepts of modern law and politics in an effort to demonstrate how the theological still inhabits the putatively secular — and, more specifically, how the very denial of transcendence requires a pure “autopositioning” which is, in Fitzpatrick’s words, “neo-deific.” Without the resort to a transcendent ground of authority, sovereignty must provide that source itself in an act of self-positing, a groundless self-grounding. Such a philosophical or conceptual approach can be distinguished from Foucault’s endeavor in \textit{STP}. Now, the distinction I am drawing here between an interrogation of the theological-philosophical dynamic of a concept like sovereignty, and a materialist Foucaultian approach to practices of (pastoral) power is not meant to imply that the former approach is lacking in political purchase because it is removed from practices which are constitutive of political reality (or indeed, on the other hand, that Foucault’s approach is somehow atheoretical, or insufficiently philosophical). Nevertheless, there is a qualitative difference here which sets Foucault’s genealogical methodology apart, and this difference is very much reflective of the Foucault of the mid-1970s (a period during which he is preoccupied with practices of power). It is instructive to look at this difference through the question of “the state” as it emerges in Foucault’s analysis.

In the years after the publication of \textit{Discipline and Punish}, Foucault was heavily criticized, primarily by the Marxist Left, for the fact that his theorization of power relations as radically dispersed and as “capillary” failed to take adequate account of more global aggregations of power. Specifically, it was argued that a proper consideration of the state apparatus and the state’s organization and centralization of violence were conspicuously absent from Foucault’s analysis.\footnote{For example, see Nicos Poulantzas, \textit{State, Power, Socialism}, trans. Patrick Camiller (London: Verso, 1980), p. 44.} Hence we see...
Foucault in this period attempt to justify and explain himself in interviews. He says, for example: “I don’t claim at all that the State apparatus is unimportant,” and “I don’t want to say that the State isn’t important; what I want to say is that relations of power, and hence the analysis that must be made of them, necessarily extend beyond the limits of the State.”

Colin Gordon reads STP as in part a reply to Foucault’s critics on this score, and he is clearly right. As we shall see, however, Foucault’s treatment of the question of the state is anything but a simple reinsertion of state apparatuses or a turning outwards, or rather upwards, of his microphysical concerns towards some cohering entity or locus of power. What Foucault proposes to do in STP is neither to write a history nor a genealogy of the state per se. Rather, what he does is to resituate this object called “the state” within the field of a practice called governmentality, the history of which, as we have seen, is predicated upon the Christian pastorate:

What I would like to show you, and will try to show you, is how the emergence of the state as a fundamental political issue can in fact be situated within a more general history of governmentality, or, if you like, in the field of practices of power. I am well aware that there are those who say that in talking about power all we do is develop an internal and circular ontology of power, but I say: Is it not precisely those who talk of the state, of its history, development, and claims, who elaborate on an entity through history and who develop the ontology of this thing that would be the state? What if the state were nothing more than a way of governing? What if the state were nothing more than a type of governmentality? (pp. 247–48)

Foucault again, in his closing comments:

All I wanted to do this year was a little experiment of method in order to show how starting from the relatively local and microscopic analysis of those typical forms of power of the pastorate it was possible, without paradox or contradiction, to return to the general problems of the state, on condition precisely that we [do not make] the state [into] a transcendent reality whose history could be undertaken on the basis of itself. It must be possible to do the history of the state on the basis of men’s actual practice, on the basis of what they do and how they think. (p. 358; punctuation in original)

So, Foucault’s “little experiment of method” consists of him according material practices of power theoretical priority in a history of the state and of his inserting


25. Although see Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Vol 1, p. 99.
the state into a genealogy of governmentality and rationalities of government. And when he investigates the history of these material practices of government, these changing rationalities of government, he finds them to be religious in origin. For Foucault, the institutionalized Christian pastorate underlies the development of governmentality in the modern West, and although he repeatedly stresses that there are discontinuities, and that pastoral techniques are taken up and redeployed in different ways, nevertheless the pastorate is “one of the decisive moments in the history of power in Western societies” (p. 185). What is central for Foucault is the problem of “individualization”:

What the history of the pastorate involves, therefore, is the entire history of procedures of human individualization in the West. Let’s say also that it involves the history of the subject. . . . [The pastorate is] a prelude to governmentality through the constitution of a specific subject, of a subject whose merits are analytically identified, who is subjected in continuous networks of obedience, and who is subjectivated through the compulsory extraction of truth. (pp. 184–5)

The process of subjectivation through the “extraction of a truth which binds one to the person who directs one’s conscience” (p. 183) is a theme pursued relentlessly by Foucault in the late work. Indeed, from the consideration of confession in the first volume of *The History of Sexuality* to the thematization of ethics in the second and third volumes of the project, Foucault is concerned to go beyond a Christian hermeneutic of the self which involves at one and the same time a deciphering of the truth of the self and a renunciation of the self on the basis of the “discovered” truth. It is against this dual decipherment and renunciation of the truth of what one “is” that Foucault’s later conceptualization of an aesthetic ethics of existence, a Nietzschean ethics of self-transgression and becoming, is counterposed. Here, Foucault links this Christian hermeneutic derived from the modality of pastoral power to modern systems of governmentality. This is a technique of political individualization — the production and conduct of governable identities through the deployment of truth, the truth of the subject — that comes to assume great importance in the organization of Western political systems. “In a way,” Foucault argues elsewhere, “we can see the state as a modern matrix of indi-

26. See O’Leary, *Foucault: The Art of Ethics*, p. 38. It is not solely a Christian hermeneutic, of course. It is to be found in other philosophical sources as well. The ethics of asceticism developed in the fourth book of Arthur Schopenhauer’s *The World as Will and Representation*, vol. 1, trans. E.J.F Payne (New York: Dover Publications, 1969), which owes conceptual debts to Buddhism and Vedic philosophy, follows a similar trajectory — a decipherment of our being as part of the metaphysical world will, and a consequent renunciation of that being (“denial of the will-to-live”). And it is precisely this renunciation that Nietzsche and Foucault will come to renounce in turn.
vidualization, or a new form of pastoral power.” Foucault leaves us much scope to develop these connections (and in a way such *aperçus* and indicative openings are perhaps what we should expect from the Collège lectures). One rather obvious way in which these insights could be developed, for example, would be to assess the way in which, in the supposedly secular context of twentieth-century communist regimes, pastoral modalities of “conversion, asceticism, self-flagellation” and such were deployed as modes of subjectification and qualification in the collective.

And yet all this would hardly be a recognizably Foucaultian engagement with power if the question of resistance were not also raised, and this is the question with which I want to close this discussion of *STP*. Readers of Foucault’s 1970s genealogical investigations of punitive rationalities and apparatuses of sexuality will be familiar with the notion of resistance being “inscribed in [power] as an irreducible opposite,” and with the idea that where there is a power relation there is always of necessity a resistance to this power, conditioning it, traversing it, supporting it, and so forth. In lecture eight, Foucault discusses various forms of resistance to the pastorate, of pastoral counter-conducts, “all of which tend to redistribute, reverse, nullify, and partially or totally discredit pastoral power in the systems of salvation, obedience and truth” (p. 204). These forms of resistance, or struggle over the terms of pastoral government, are: the practice of asceticism, the formation of communities, the cultivation of mysticism, a return to scripture, and an embrace of eschatology (pp. 204–14). As Foucault stresses, these forms of resistance to the pastoral conduct of souls are “clearly not absolutely external to Christianity, but are actually border-elements” (pp. 214–15). They are neither external to Christianity nor do they aim at a complete overthrowing of relations of governance *tout court*. Rather, they try to disrupt the particular alignment of governance practiced by the pastorate, along the axis of salvation, obedience, and truth. For example, asceticism is a challenge to the pastorate’s emphasis on obedience to the other, the master. The ascetic excludes a relation of obedience to the other through the prioritization of the ascetic relation of self to self; as Foucault says, “in asceticism there is a specific excess that denies access to an external power” (p. 208). The cultivation of mysticism, on the other hand, challenges the pastorate’s political mobilization of truth — in mysticism, as Foucault recounts, “[t]he soul is not offered to the other for examination, through a system of confessions [*aveux*].

27. Foucault, “The Subject and Power,” p. 335.
In mysticism the soul sees itself. It sees itself in God and it sees God in itself. To that extent mysticism fundamentally, essentially, escapes examination” (p. 212). These forms of resistance to the pastorate all seem to coalesce around the question of the relationship of self to self, the fundamental question of the refusal of the categories of political individualization and the politics of truth upon which the pastorate, in its openly theological form and its statist avatars, relies.

Indeed, one of the important aspects of this lecture course is the way in which it shows Foucault moving from an understanding of resistance in terms of its being immanent to power, being inscribed within it, and so forth, to a focusing of the problematic of resistance on the question of the truth of the self (and the political contestation of this truth). This thinking of resistance poses a concrete challenge to liberal theories of individual rights, and those forms of resistance to state power which would try to ground resistance in some notion of the individual and what is due to her, without interrogating the forms of political individualization being relied upon and mobilized. As Foucault writes in “*Omnes et Singulatim*”:

Very significantly, political criticism has reproached the state with being simultaneously a factor for individualization and a totalitarian principle. Just to look at nascent state rationality, just to see what its first policing project was, makes it clear that, right from the start, the state is both individualizing and totalitarian. Opposing the individual and his interest to it is just as hazardous as opposing it with the community and its requirements. Political rationality has grown and imposed itself all throughout the history of Western societies. It first took its stand on the idea of pastoral power, then on that of reason of state. Its inevitable effects are both individualization and totalization. Liberation can come only from attacking not just one of these two effects but political rationality’s very roots.

Despite the above language of liberation, this is anything but a simple reinscription of the liberal subject of right/s. Rather, what Foucault is gesturing towards is a more “risky,” anti-foundationalist questioning of the truth of the political subject as she is daily (re)constituted in political engagement.

**III. Conclusion**

I have argued that one of the important tasks which Foucault is trying to accomplish in this lecture course is an analysis and a bringing to light of the theological grounds

30. Foucault, “*Omnes et Singulatim*,” p. 325.

of modern practices of power and political subjectivity. Characteristically for Foucault, this is achieved through a discussion of practices and, crucially, of resistances to these practices. And we must remember that Foucault’s genealogy is itself a form of resistance. “The critical intention of genealogical analysis,” writes Mark Poster, “is to reveal a difference in a phenomenon in such a way that it undermines the self-certainty of the present without presenting the past as an alternative.”\(^ {32}\) If Foucault’s later interpretations of ancient Greek and Hellenist ethics have been criticized for their seeming valorization of the past as a solution to the political ills of the present, nevertheless in \textit{STP} we have an arresting example of the kind of genealogy for which Foucault was justly famous: an interrogation of, and a rendering strange of, the limits of the present. This interrogation, carried out in the later work under the banner of “critique” or “historical ontology,” questions the sedimentation of what we are, the accretion of political subjectivities that are given to us. In revealing the pastoral logic of our purportedly secular political rationality, Foucault’s genealogy in \textit{STP} moves us to question the configuration of subjectivity and truth, and this is the very movement of critique:

> Critique will be the art of voluntary inservitude, of reflective indocility. The essential function of critique would be that of desubjectification in the game of what one could call, in a word, the politics of truth.\(^ {33}\)


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