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Photography’s Discursive Spaces: Landscape/View

By Rosalind Krauss

Let us start with two images, identically titled *Tufa Domes, Pyramid Lake, Nevada*. The first (Fig. 1) is a (recently) celebrated photograph made by Timothy O’Sullivan in 1868 that functions with special insistence within the art historical construction of nineteenth-century landscape photography. The second (Fig. 2) is a lithographic copy of the first, produced for the publication of Clarence King’s *Systematic Geology* in 1878.¹

Twentieth-century sensibility welcomes the original O’Sullivan as a model of the mysterious, silent beauty to which landscape photography had access during the early decades of the medium. In the photograph, three bulky masses of rock are seen as if deployed on a kind of abstract, transparent chessboard, marking by their separate positions a retreating trajectory into depth. A fanatical descriptive clarity has bestowed on the bodies of these rocks a hallucinatory wealth of detail, so that each crevice, each granular trace of the original volcanic heat finds its record. Despite all this, the rocks seem unreal and the space dreamlike, the tufa domes appear as if suspended in a luminous ether, unbounded and directionless. The brilliance of this undifferentiated ground, in which water and sky connect in an almost seamless continuum, overpowers the material objects within it, so that if the rocks seem to float, to hover, they do so as shape merely. The luminous ground overmasters their bulk, making them instead, the functions of design. The mysterious beauty of the image is in this opulent flattening of its space.

By comparison, the lithograph is an object of insistent visual banality. Everything that is mysterious in the photograph has been explained with supplemental, chatty detail. Clouds have been massed in the sky. The far shore of the lake has been given a definitive shape. The surface of the lake has been characterized by little eddies and ripples. And most important for the demotion of this image from strange to commonplace, the reflections of the rocks in the water have been carefully recreated, so that gravity and direction are now restored to this space formerly awash with the vague luminosity of too rapidly exposed collodion.

But it is clear, of course, that the difference between the two images—the photograph and its translation—is not a function of the inspiration of the photographer and the insipidity of the lithographer. They belong, instead, to two separate domains of culture, they assume different expectations in the user of the image, they convey two distinct kinds of knowledge; in a more recent vocabulary, one would say that they operate as representations within two separate discursive spaces, as members of two different discourses. The lithograph belongs to the discourse of geology and, thus, of empirical science. In order for it to function within this discourse, the ordinary elements of topographical description had to be restored to the image produced by

![Fig. 1](image1.jpg) Timothy O’Sullivan, *Tufa Domes, Pyramid Lake* (Nevada), 1868.

![Fig. 2](image2.jpg) Photolithograph after O’Sullivan, *Tufa Domes, Pyramid Lake*, Published in King Survey report, 1875.
O'Sullivan. The coordinates of a continuous homogeneous space, mapped not so much by perspective as by the cartographic grid, had to be reconstructed in terms of a coherent recession along an intelligibly horizontal plane retreating towards a definite horizon. The geological data of the tufa domes had to be grounded, coordinated, mapped. As shapes afloat on a continuous, vertical plane, they would have been useless.  

And the photograph? Within what discursive space does it operate?

Aesthetic discourse as it developed in the nineteenth century organized itself increasingly around what could be called the space of exhibition. Whether public museum, official salon, world’s fair, or private showing, the space of exhibition was constituted in part by the continuous surface of wall, a wall increasingly unstructured for any purpose other than the display of art. The space of exhibition had other features besides the gallery wall. It was also the ground of criticism, which is to say, on the one hand, the ground of a written response to the works’ appearance in that special context, and, on the other, the implicit ground of choice—of either inclusion or exclusion—with everything excluded from the space of exhibition becoming marginalized with regard to its status as Art.  

Given its function as the physical vehicle of exhibition, the gallery wall became the signer of inclusion and, thus, can be seen as constituting in itself a representation of what could be called exhibitionality, or that which was developing as the crucial medium of exchange between patrons and artists within the changing structure of art in the nineteenth century. And in the last half of the century painting—particularly landscape painting—responded with its own corresponding set of depictions. It began to internalize the space of exhibition—

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Fig. 3 Samuel Bourne, *A Road Lined with Poplars, Kashmir, 1863–70*, albumen-silver print from a glass negative, $8\frac{1}{2}\times 11\frac{3}{4}$, Collection, Paul F. Walter, New York.

Fig. 4 Auguste Salzmann, *Jerusalem, The Temple Wall, West Side, 1853–54*, salt print from a paper negative, $9\frac{1}{4}\times 14\frac{3}{4}$, Collection, The Museum of Modern Art, New York, Purchase.

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...the wall—and to represent it.

The transformation of landscape after 1860 into a flattened and compressed experience of space spreading laterally across the surface was extremely rapid. It began with the insistent voiding of perspective, as landscape painting counteracted perspective recession with a variety of devices, among them sharp value contrast, which had the effect of converting the orthogonal penetration of depth—effected, for example, by a lane of trees—into a diagonal ordering of the surface. No sooner had this compression occurred, constituting within the single easel painting a representation of the very space of exhibition, than other means of composing this representation were employed: serial landscapes, hung in succession, mimed the horizontal extension of the wall, as in Monet’s Rouen Cathedral paintings; or landscapes, compressed and horizonless, expanded to become the absolute size of the wall. The synonymy of landscape and wall—the one
a representation of the other—of Monet’s late waterlilies is thus an advanced moment in a series of operations in which aesthetic discourse resolves itself around a representation of the very space that grounds it institutionally.

Needless to say, this constitution of the work of art as a representation of its own space of exhibition is in fact what we know as the history of modernism. Thus, it is now fascinating to watch historians of photography assimilating their medium to the logic of that history. For if we ask, once again, within what discursive space does the original O’Sullivan—as I described it at the outset—function, we have to answer: that of the aesthetic discourse. And if we ask, then, what it is a representation of, the answer must be that within this space it is constituted as a representation of the plane of exhibition, the surface of the museum, the capacity of the gallery to constitute the objects it selects for inclusion as art.

But did O’Sullivan in his own day, the 1860s and 1870s, construct his work for the aesthetic discourse and the space of exhibition? Or did he create it for the scientific/topographical discourse which it more or less efficiently serves? Is the interpretation of O’Sullivan’s work as a representation of aesthetic values—flatness, graphic design, ambiguity, and, behind these, certain intentions towards aesthetic significations: sublimity, transcendence—not a retrospective construction designed to secure it as art? And is this projection not illegitimate, the composition of a false history?

This question has a special methodological thrust from the vantage of the present, as a newly organized and energized history of photography is at work constructing an account of the early years of the medium. Central to this account is that type of photography, most of it topographical in character, originally undertaken for the purposes of exploration, expedition, and survey. Matted, framed, labeled, these images now enter the space of historical reconstruction through the museum. Decorously isolated on the wall of exhibition, the objects can now be read according to a certain logic, a logic that insists on their representational character within the discursive space of art, in an attempt to “legitimate” them. The term is Peter Galassi’s, and the issue of legitimacy was the focus of the Museum of Modern Art exhibition Before Photography, which he organized. In a sentence that has been repeated by every reviewer of his argument, Galassi sets up this question of photography’s position with respect to the aesthetic discourse: “The object here is to show that photography was not a bastard left by science on the doorstep of art, but a legitimate child of the Western pictorial tradition.”

The legitimation that follows depends on something far more ambitious than proving that certain nineteenth-century photographers had pretensions to being artists, or theorizing that photographs were as good as, or even superior to, paintings, or showing that photographic societies organized exhibitions on the model of Establishment salons. Legitimations depend on going beyond the presentation of apparent membership in a given family; they demand, instead, the demonstration of the internal, genetic necessity of such membership. Galassi wants, therefore, to address internal, formal structures rather than external, circumstantial details. To this end he wishes to prove that the perspective so prominent in nineteenth-century outdoor photography—a perspective that tends to flatten, to fragment, to generate ambiguous overlap; a perspective to which Galassi gives the name “analytic,” as opposed to the “synthetic” constructive perspective of the Renaissance—was fully developed by the late eighteenth century within the discipline of painting. The force of this proof, Galassi maintains, will be to rebut the notion that photography is essentially a “child of technical rather than aesthetic traditions” and, thus, an outsider to the internal issues of aesthetic debate and to show, instead, that it is a product of that very same spirit of inquiry within the arts that welcomed and developed both “analytic” perspective and an empiricist vision. The radically foreshortened and elliptical sketches by Constable (and even Degas) can then be used as models for a subsequent photographic practice, which in Galassi’s exhibition turns out overwhelmingly to be that of topography: Samuel Bourne, Felice Beato, August Salzmann, Charles Marville, and, of course, Timothy O’Sullivan.

And the photographs respond as they are bid. The Bourne of a road in Kashmir (Fig. 3), in its steep split in values, empties perspective of its spatial significance and reinvests it with a two-dimensional order every bit as powerfully as a contemporary Monet. The Salzmann (Fig. 4), in its fanatical recording of the texture of stone on a wall that fills the frame with a nearly uniform tonal continuum, assimilates its depiction of empirical detail to a representation of the pictorial infrastructure. And the O’Sullivans (Figs. 1 and 5), with their rock formations engulfed by that passive, blank, collodion sky, flatten into the same hypnotically seen but two-dimensionally experienced order that characterized the

Fig. 5 Timothy O’Sullivan, Shoshone Falls (Idaho), 1868.
Tufa Domes of Pyramid Lake. Viewing the evidence on the walls of the museum, we have no doubt that Art has not only been intended, but has also been represented: in the flattened, decoratively unifying drawing of "analytic" perspective.

But here is where the demonstration runs into difficulty. For Timothy O'Sullivan's photographs were not published in the nineteenth century and the only real public distribution they can be shown to have had was through the medium of stereography. Most of the famous O'Sullivan—the Canyon de Chelly ruins from the Wheeler Expedition, for example—exist as stereographic views, and it was to these that, in O'Sullivan's case, as in William Henry Jackson's, the wider public had access. Thus, if we began with a comparison between two images—the photograph and the lithographic translation—we can continue with a comparison between two cameras: a 9 × 12 plate camera and a camera for stereoscopic views. And these two pieces of equipment mark distinct domains of experience.

Stereographic space is perspectival space raised to a higher power. Organized as a kind of tunnel vision, the experience of deep recession is insistent and inescapable. This experience is all the more heightened by the fact that the viewer's own ambient space is masked out by the optical instrument he must hold before his eyes. As he views the image in an ideal isolation, his own surrounds, with their walls and floors, are banished from sight. The apparatus of the stereoscope mechanically focuses all attention on the matter at hand and precludes the visual meandering experienced in the museum gallery as one's eyes wander from picture to picture and to surrounding space. Instead, the refocusing of attention can occur only within the spectator's channel of vision constructed by the optical machine.

The stereographic image appears multi-layered, a steep gradient of different planes stretching away from the nearby space, into depth. The operation of viewing this space involves scanning the field of the image, moving from its lower left corner, say, to its upper right. That much is like looking at a painting. But the actual experience of this scan is something wholly different. As one moves, visually, through the stereoscopic tunnel from inspecting the nearest ground to attending to an object in the middle-distance, one has the sensation of refocusing one's eyes. And then again, into the farthest plane, another effort is made, and felt, to refocus. These micro-muscular efforts are the kinesthetic counterpart to the sheerly optical illusion of the stereograph. They are a kind of enactment, only on a very reduced scale, of what happens when a deep channel of space is opened before one. The actual readjustment of the eyes from plane to plane within the stereoscopic field is the representation by one part of the body of what another part of the body, the feet, would do in passing through real space. And it goes without saying that from this physio-optical traversal of the stereo field, another difference between it and pictorial space derives. This is a difference that concerns the dimension of time.

The contemporary accounts of what it was like to look at stereographs all dilate on the length of time spent examining the contents of the image. For Oliver Wendell Holmes, Sr., a passionate advocate of stereography, this perusal was the response appropriate to the "inexhaustible" wealth of detail provided by the image. As he picks his way over this detail in his writing on stereography—in describing, for example, his experience of an E. & H.T. Anthony view up Broadway—Holmes enacts for his readers the protracted engagement with the spectacle demanded by stereo viewing. By contrast, paintings do not require (and as they become more modernist, certainly do not support) this temporal dilation of attention, this minute-by-minute examining of every inch of the ground.

When Holmes characterizes this special modality of viewing, where "the mind feels its way into the very depths of the picture," he has recourse to extreme mental states—like hypnotism, "half-magnetic effects," and dream. "At least the shutting out of surrounding objects, and the concentration of the whole attention which is a consequence of this, produce a dream-like exaltation," he writes, "in which we seem to leave the body behind us and sail away into one strange scene after another, like disembodied spirits." The phenomenology of the stereoscope produces a situation that is not unlike that of looking at cinema. Both involve the isolation of the viewer with an image from which surrounding interference is masked out. In both, the image transports the viewer optically, while his body remains immobile. In both, the pleasure derives from the experience of the simulacrum: the appearance of reality from which any testing of the real-effect by actually, physically, moving through the scene is denied. And in both, the real-effect of the simulacrum is heightened by a temporal dilution. What has been called the apparatus of cinematic process had, then, a certain proto-history in the institution of stereography, just as stereography's own proto-history is to be found in the similarly darkened and isolating but spectacularly illusionistic space of the dioramas. And in the case of the stereograph, as would later be the case for film, the specific pleasures that seem to be released by that apparatus—the desires that it seems to gratify—led to the instantly wild popularity of the instrument.

The diffusion of stereography as a truly mass medium was made possible by mechanized printing techniques. Beginning in the 1850s but continuing almost unabated into the 1880s, the figures for stereo sales are dizzying. As early as 1857 the London Stereoscopic Company had sold 500,000 stereoscopes and, in 1859, was able to claim a catalogue listing more than 100,000 different stereo views.

It is in this very term—view—by which the practice of stereoscopy identified its object, that we can locate the particularity of that experience. First of all, view speaks to the dramatic insistence of the perspectivally organized depth that I have been describing. This was often heightened, or acknowledged, by the makers of stereo views by structuring the image around a vertical marker in fore- or middle-ground that works to center the space, forming a representation within the visual field of the eyes' convergence at a vanishing point. Many of Timothy O'Sullivan's images organize themselves around such a center—the staff of a bare tree-trunk, the sheer edge of a rock formation—whose compositional sense derives from the special sensations of the view. Given O'Sullivan's tendency to compose around the diagonal recession and centering of the view, it is not surprising to find that in his one published account of his work as a Western photographer he consistently speaks of what he makes as "views" and what he does when making them as "viewing." Writing of the expedition to Pyramid Lake, he describes the provisions, "among which may be mentioned the instruments and chemicals necessary for our photographer to 'work up his view.'" Of the Humboldt Sink, he says, "It was a pretty location to work in, and viewing there was as pleasant work as could be desired." View was the term consistently used in the photographic journals, as it was overwhelmingly the appellation photographers gave to their entries in photographic salons in the 1860s. Thus, even when consciously entering the space of exhibition, they tended to choose view rather than landscape as their descriptive category.

Further, view addresses a notion of authorship in which the natural phenomenon, the point of interest, rises up to confront the viewer, seemingly without the mediation of an individual recorder or artist, leaving "authorship" of the views to their publishers, rather than to the operators (as they were called) who took the pictures. Thus, authorship is characteristically made a function of publication, with copyright held by the various companies, e.g., © Keystone Views, while the photographers remain anonymous. In this sense the phenomenological character of the view, its exaggerated depth and focus, opens onto a second feature, which is the isolating of the object of that view. Indeed, it is a "point of interest," a natural wonder, a

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singular phenomenon that comes to occupy this centering of attention. This experience of the singular is, as Barbara Stafford has shown in an examination of singularity as a special category associated with travel accounts beginning in the late eighteenth century, founded on the transfer of authorship from the subjectivity of the artist to the objective manifestations of nature. For this reason, the institution of the view does not claim the imaginative projection of an author so much as the legal protection of property in the form of the copyright.

Finally, view registers this singularity, this focal point, as one moment in a complex representation of the world, a kind of complete topographical atlas. For the physical space within which the “views” were kept was invariably a cabinet in whose drawers were catalogued and stored a whole geographical system. The file cabinet is very different as an object from the wall or the easel. It holds out the possibility of storing and cross-referencing bits of information and of collating them through the particular grid of a system of knowledge. The elaborate cabinets of stereo views that were part of the furnishing of nineteenth-century middle-class homes as well as of the equipment of public libraries comprise a compound representation of geographic space. The spatiality of the view, its insistent penetration, functions, then, as the sensory model for a more abstract system whose subject is also space. View and land survey are interdetermined and interrelated.

What can be seen to emerge from this analysis, then, is a system of historically specific requirements that were satisfied by the view and in relation to which view formed a coherent discourse. That this discourse is disjunct from what aesthetic discourse intends by the term “landscape” is also, I hope, apparent. Just as the view’s construction of space cannot be assimilated, phenomenologically, to the compressed and fragmented space of what Before Photography calls analytic perspective, so the representation formed by the collectivity of these views cannot be likened to the representation organized by the space of exhibition. The one composes an image of geographic order, the other represents the space of an autonomous Art and its idealized, specialized History, which is constituted by aesthetic discourse. The complex collective representations of that quality called style—period style, personal style—are dependent upon the space of exhibition; one could say they are a function of it. Modern art history is in that sense a product of the most rigorously organized nineteenth-century space of exhibition: the museum. It is André Malraux who has explained to us how, in its turn, the museum, with its succession of (representations of) styles, collectively organizes the master representation of Art. Having updated themselves through the institution of the modern art book, Malraux’s museums are now “without walls,” the galleries’ contents collectivized by means of photographic reproduction. But this serves only to intensify the picture:

Thus it is that, thanks to the rather specious unity imposed by the photographic reproduction on a multiplicity of objects, ranging from the statue to the bas-relief, from bas-reliefs to seal-impressions, and from these to the plaques of the nomads, a “Babylonian style” seems to emerge as a real entity, not a mere classification—as something resembling, rather the life-story of a great creator. Nothing conveys more vividly and compellingly the notion of a destiny shaping human ends than do the great styles, whose evolutions and transformations seem like long scars that Fate has left, in passing, on the face of the earth. Having decided that nineteenth-century photography belongs in a museum, having decided that the genres of aesthetic discourse are applicable to it, having decided that the art historical model will map nicely onto this material, recent scholars of photography have decided (ahead of time) quite a lot. For one thing, they have concluded that given images are landscapes (rather than views) and they are thus certain about the discourse these images belong to and what they are representations of. For another (but it is a conclusion that is reached simultaneously with the first), they have determined that other fundamental concepts of aesthetic discourse will be applicable to this visual archive. One of these is the concept artist with its correlative notion of sustained and intentional progress, to which we give the term career. The other is the possibility of coherence and meaning that will unfold through the collective body of work so produced, this constituting the unity of an oeuvre. But, it can be argued, these are terms that nineteenth-century topographic photography tends not only not to support, but also to open to question.

The concept artist implies more than the mere fact of authorship; it also suggests that one must go through certain steps to earn the right to claim the condition of being an author, the word artist somehow semantically being connected with the notion of vocation. Generally, “vocation” implies an apprenticeship, a juvenilia, a learning of the tradition of one’s craft, the gaining of an individual view of that tradition through a process that includes both success and failure. If this, or at least some part of it, is what is necessarily included in the term artist, can we then imagine someone being an artist for just one year? Would this not be a logical (some would say, grammatical) contradiction, like the example adduced by Stanley Cavell in relation to aesthetic judgments, where he repeats Wittgenstein’s question: “Could someone have a feeling of ardent love or hope for the space of one second—no matter what preceded or followed this second?” But this is the case with August Salzmann, whose career as a photographer began in 1853 and was over in less than a year. Little else on the horizon of nineteenth-century photography appeared only to vanish quite so meteorically. But other major figures within this history enter this métier and then leave it in less than a decade. This is true of the careers of Roger Fenton, Gustave LeGray, and Henri LeSecq, all of them acknowledged “masters” of the art. Some of these desertions involved a return to the more traditional arts; others, like Fenton’s, meant taking up a totally different field such as the law. What do the span and nature of these engagements with the medium mean for the concept of career? Can we study these “careers” with the same methodological presuppositions, the same assumptions of personal style and its continuity, that we bring to the careers of another sort of artist?

And what of the other great aesthetic unity: oeuvre? Once again we encounter practices that seem difficult to bring into conformity with what the term comprises, with its assumptions that the oeuvre is the result of sustained intention and that it is organically related to the effort of its maker: that it is coherent. One practice already mentioned was the imperious assumption of copyright, so that certain oeuvres, like Matthew Brady’s and Francis Frith’s, are largely a function of the work of their employees. Another practice, related to the nature of photographic commissions, left large bodies of the “oeuvre” unachieved. An example is the Heliographic Mission of 1851 in which LeSecq, LeGray, Baldus, Bayard, and Mestral (which is to say some of the greatest figures in early photographic history in France) did survey work for the Commission des Monuments Historiques. Their results, some 300 negatives in which were recorded medieval architecture about to submit to restoration, not only were never published or exhibited by the Commission, but were never even printed. This is analogous to a director shooting a film but never having the footage developed, hence never seeing the rushes. How would the result fit into the oeuvre of this director?

There are other practices, other exhibits, in the archive that also test the applicability of the concept oeuvre. One of these is the body of work that is too meager for this notion; the other is the body that is too large. Can we imagine an oeuvre consisting of one work? The history of photography tries to do this with the single photographic effort ever produced by August Salzmann, a lone volume of archaeological photographs (of great formal beauty), some por-
tion of which are known to have been taken by his assistant. And, at the opposite extreme, can we imagine an oeuvre consisting of 10,000 works?

Eugène Atget’s labors produced a vast body of work which he sold over the years of its production, roughly 1895–1927, to various historical collections, such as the Bibliothèque de la Ville de Paris, the Musée de la Ville de Paris (Musée Carnavalet), the Bibliothèque Nationale, the Monuments Historiques, as well as to commercial builders and artists. The assimilation of this work of documentation into a specifically aesthetic discourse began in 1925 with its notice and publication by the Surrealists and was followed, in 1929, by its placement within the photographic sensibility of the German New Vision. Thus began the various partial viewings of the 10,000-piece archive; each view the result of a selection intended to make a given aesthetic or formal point.

The repetitive rhythm of accumulation that interested the *Neue Sachlichkeit* could be found and illustrated within this material, as could the collage sensibility of the Surrealists, who were particularly drawn to the Atget shopfronts, which they made famous. Other selections sustain other interpretations of the material. The frequent visual superimpositions of object and agent, as when Atget himself is captured as a reflection in the glazed entrance of the café he is photographing, permit a reading of the work as reflexive, picturing its own conditions of making. Other readings of the images are more architectonically formal. They see Atget managing to locate a point around which the complex spatial trajectories of the site will unfold with an especially clarifying symmetry. Most often images of parks and rural scenes are used for such analyses.

But each of these readings is partial, like tiny core samples that are extracted from a vast geological field, each displaying the presence of a different ore. Or like the blindmen’s elephant. Ten thousand pieces are a lot to collate. Yet, if Atget’s work is to be considered art, and he an artist, this collation must be made; we must acknowledge ourselves to be in the presence of an oeuvre. The Museum of Modern Art’s four-part exhibition of Atget, assembled under the already loaded title *Atget and the Art of Photography*, moves briskly towards the solution of this problem, always assuming that the model that will serve to ensure the unity for this archive is the concept of an *artist’s oeuvre*. For what else could it be?

John Szarkowski, after recognizing that, from the point of view of formal invention, the work is extremely uneven, speculates on why this should be so:

There are a number of ways to interpret this apparent incoherence. We could assume that it was Atget’s goal to make glorious pictures that would delight and thrill us, and that in this ambition he failed as often as not. Or we could assume that he began photographing as a novice and gradually, through the pedagogical device of work, learned to use his peculiar, recalcitrant medium with economy and sureness, so that his work became better and better as he grew older. Or we could point out that he worked both for others and for himself and that the work he did for himself was better, because it served a more demanding master. Or we could say that it was Atget’s goal to explain in visual terms an issue of great richness and complexity—the spirit of his own culture—and that in service to this goal he was willing to accept the results of his own best efforts, even when they did not rise above the role of simple records.

I believe that all of these explanations are in some degree true, but the last is especially interesting to us.
since it is so foreign to our understanding of artistic ambition. It is not easy for us to be comfortable with the idea that an artist might work as a servant to an idea larger than he. We have been educated to believe, or rather, to assume, that no value transcends the value of the creative individual. A logical corollary of this assumption is that no subject matter except the artist's own sensibility is quite worthy of his best attention. 21

This inching forward from the normal categories of description of aesthetic production—formal success/formal failure; apprenticeship/maturity; public commission/personal statement—towards a position that he acknowledges as "foreign to our understanding of artistic ambition," namely, work "in the service of an issue larger than self-expression," evidently troubles Szarkowski. So that just before breaking off this train of thought he meditates on why Atget revisited sites (sometimes after several years) to choose different aspects of, say, a given building to photograph. Szarkowski's answer resolves itself in forms of formal success/formal failure and the categories of artistic maturation that are consistent with the notion of oeuvre. His own persistence in thinking about the work in relation to this aesthetic model surfaces in his decision to continue to treat it in terms of stylistic evolution: "The earlier pictures show the tree as complete and discrete, as an object against a ground; as centrally positioned within the frame; as frontally centered, from behind the photographer's shoulder. The later pictures show the tree radically cut by the frame, asymmetrically positioned, and more obviously inflected by the quality of light that falls upon it." 22 This is what produces the "elegiac" mood of some of the late work.

But this whole matter of artistic intention and stylistic evolution must be integrated with the "idea larger than he" that Atget can be thought to have served. If the 10,000 images form Atget's picture of the larger idea, then that idea can inform us of Atget's aesthetic intentions, for there will be a reciprocal relation between the two, one inside, the other outside the artist.

To get hold, simultaneously, of this larger idea and of Atget's elusive intentions in making this vast archive ("It is difficult," Szarkowski writes, "to name an important artist of the modern period whose life and intention have been so perfectly withheld from us as those of Eugène Atget."); it was long believed to be necessary to decipher the code provided by Atget's negative numbers. Each of the 10,000 plates is numbered. Yet the numbers are not strictly successive; they do not organize the work chronologically; they sometimes double back on each other. 2 3 For researchers into the problem of Atget's oeuvre, the numbers were seen as providing the all-important code to the artist's intentions and the work's meaning. Maria Morris Hambourg has finally and most definitively deciphered this code, to find in it the systematization of a catalogue of topographic subjects, divided into five major series and many smaller sub-series and groups. 2 4 The names given to the various series and groupings, names like Landscape-Documents, Picturesque Paris, Environments, Old-France, etc., establish as the master, larger idea for the work a collective picture of the spirit of French culture—not unlike, we could say, the undertaking of Balzac in the Comédie Humaine. In relation to this master subject, Atget's vision can then be organized around a set of intentions that are socio-aesthetic, so to speak; he becomes photography's great visual anthropologist. The unifying intention of the oeuvre can then be understood as a continuing search for the representation of the moment of interface between nature and culture, as in the juxtaposition of the vines growing beside a farmhouse window curtailed in a lace representation of schematized leaves (fig. 6). But this analysis, interesting and often brilliant as it is, is once again only partial. The desire to represent the paradigm nature/culture can be traced in only a small fraction of the images and then, like the trail of an elusive animal, it dies out, leaving the intentions as mute and mysterious as ever.

What is interesting in this case is that the Museum of Modern Art and Maria Morris Hambourg hold in their hands the solution to this mystery, a key that will not so much unlock the system of Atget's aesthetic intentions as dispel them. And this example seems all the more informative as it demonstrates the resistance of the museological and art historical disciplines to using that key.

The coding system Atget applied to his images derives from the card files of the libraries and topographic collections for which Atget worked. His subjects are often standardized, dictated by the established categories of survey and historical documentation. The reason many of Atget's street images uncannily resemble the photographs by Marville taken a half century earlier is that both are functions of the same documentary master-plan. 2 5 A catalogue is not so much an idea as it is a mathesis, a system of organization. It submits not so much to intellectual as to institutional analysis. And it seems very clear that Atget's work is the function of a catalogue that he had no hand in inventing and for which authorship is an irrelevant term.

The normal conditions of authorship that the Museum wishes to maintain tend to collapse under this observation, leading us to a rather startling reflection. The Museum undertook to crack the code of Atget's negative numbers in order to discover an aesthetic anima. What they found, instead, was a card catalogue.

With this in mind we get a very different answer to various earlier questions, like the problem of why Atget photographed certain subjects piecemeal, the image of a façade separated by months or even years from the view of the same building's doorway or window Mullions or wrought-iron work. The answer, it would seem, lies less in the conditions of aesthetic success or failure than in the requirements of the catalogue and its categorical spaces.

Subject is the fulcrum in all of this. Are the doorways and the ironwork balconies Atget's subjects, his choices, the manifest expression of him as active subject, thinking, willing, intending, creating? Or are they simply (although there is nothing simple in this) subjects, the functions of the catalogue, to which Atget himself is subject? What possible price of historical clarity are we willing to pay in order to maintain the former interpretation over the latter?

Everything that has been put forward about the need to abandon or at least to submit to a serious critique the aesthetically derived categories of authorship, oeuvre, and genre (as in landscape) obviously amounts to an attempt to maintain early photography as an archive and to call for the sort of archaeological examination of this archive that Michel Foucault both theorizes and provides a model for. Describing the analysis to which archaeology submits the archive in order to reveal the conditions of its discursive formations, Foucault writes that [They] must not be understood as a set of determinations imposed from the outside on the thought of individuals, or inhabiting it from the inside, in advance as it were; they constitute rather the set of conditions in accordance with which a practice is exercised, in accordance with which that practice gives rise to partially or totally new statements, and in accordance with which it can be modified. [The relations established by archaeology] are not so much limitations imposed on the initiative of subjects as the field in which that initiative is articulated (without however constituting its center), rules that it puts into operation (without it having invented or formulated them), relations that provide it with a support (without it being either their final result or their point of convergence). [Archaeology] is an attempt to reveal discursive practices in their complexity and density; to show that to speak is to do something—something other than to express what one thinks. 2 6

Everywhere at present there is an attempt to dismantle the photographic archive—the set of practices, institutions, and relation-

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ships to which nineteenth-century photography originally belonged—and to reassemble it within the categories previously constituted by art and its history. It is not hard to conceive of what the inducements for doing so are, but it is more difficult to understand the tolerance for the kind of incoherence it produces.

Notes


2 The cartographic grid onto which this information is reconstructed has other purposes besides the collation of scientific information. As Alan Trachtenberg argues, the government-sponsored Western surveys were intended to gain access to the mineral resources needed for industrialization. It was an industrial as well as a scientific program that generated this photography, which “when viewed outside the context of the reports it accompanied seems to perpetuate the landscape tradition.” And Trachtenberg continues: “The photographs represent an essential aspect of the enterprise, a form of record keeping; they contributed to the federal government’s policy of supplying fundamental needs of industrialization, needs for reliable data concerning raw materials, and promoted a public willingness to support government policy of conquest, settlement, and exploitation.” Alan Trachtenberg, *The Incorporation of America*, New York, Hill and Wang, 1982, p. 20.

3 In his important essay “L’espace de l’art,” Jean-Claude Lebensztejn discusses the museum’s function, since its relatively recent inception, in determining what will count as Art: “The museum has a double but complementary function: to exclude everything else, and through this exclusion to constitute what we mean by the word art. It does not overstate the case to say that the concept of art underwent a profound transformation when a space, fashioned for its very definition, was opened to contain it.” In Lebensztejn, *Zigzag*, Paris, Flammarion, 1981, p. 41.

4 The treatment of Western survey photography as continuous with painterly depictions of nature is everywhere in the literature. Barbara Novak, Weston Naef, and Elisabeth Lindquist-Cock are three specialists who see this work as an extension of those landscape sensibilities operative in American nineteenth-century painting, with transcendental fervor constantly conditioning the way nature is seen. Thus, the by-now standard argument about the King/O’ Sullivan collaboration is that this visual material amounts to a proof-by-photography of creationism and the presence of God. King, it is argued, resisted both Lyell’s geological uniformitarianism and Darwin’s evolutionism. A catastrophist, King read the geological records of the Utah and Nevada landscape as a series of acts of creation in which all species were given their permanent shape by a divine creator. The great upheavals and escarpments, the dramatic basalt formations were, it is argued, all produced by nature and photographed by O’Sullivan as proof of King’s catastrophist doctrine. With this mission to perform, the Western photography of O’Sullivan becomes continuous with the landscape vision of Bierstadt or Church.

Although there is some support for this argument, there is an equal amount of support for its opposite: King was a serious scientist, who, for example, made great efforts to publish as part of the findings of his survey Marsh’s palaeontological finds, which he knew full well provided one of the important “missing links” needed to give empirical support to Darwin’s theory. Furthermore, as we have seen, O’Sullivan’s photographs in their lithographic form function as neutralized, scientific testimony in the context of King’s report: the transcendentalists’ God does not inhabit the visual field of *Systematic Geology*. See, Barbara Novak, *Nature and Culture*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1980; Weston Naef, *Era of Exploration*, New York, The Metropolitan Museum of Art, 1975; and Elisabeth Lindquist-Cock, *Influence of Photography on American Landscape Painting*, New York, Garland Press, 1977.


7 The eye is not actually refocusing, of course. Rather, given the nearness of the image to the eyes and the fixity of the head in relation to it, in order to scan the space of the image a viewer must readjust and recoordinate the two eyeballs from point to point as vision moves over the surface.


11 “Photographs from the High Rockies,” *Harper’s Magazine*, XXXIX (September 1869), pp. 465–75. In this article *Tufo Domes, Pyramid Lake* finds yet one more place of publication, in a crude translation of the photograph, this time as an illustration to the author’s adventure narrative. Thus one more imaginative space is projected onto the blank, collodion screen. This time, in response to the account of the near capsizethe exploration party’s boat, the engraver whips the waters into a darkened frenzy and the sky into banks of lowering storm clouds.

12 Thus Stafford writes, “The concept that true history is natural history emancipates the objects of nature from the government of man. For the idea of singularity it is significant that geological phenomena—taken in their widest sense to include specimens from the mineral kingdom—constitute landscape forms in which natural history finds aesthetic expression. . . . The final stage in the historicizing of nature sees the products of history naturalized. In 1789, the German savant Samuel Witte—basing his conclusions on the writings of Desmaretet, Dutil and Faujas de Saint-Fond—annexed the pyramids of Egypt for nature, declaring that they were basalt eruptions; he also identified the ruins of Persepolis, Babel, Palmyra, as well as the Temple of Jupiter at Agrigento and the Palace of the Incas in Peru, as lithic outcroppings.” Barbara M. Stafford, “Toward Romantic Landscape Perception: Illustrated Travels and the Rise of ‘Singularity’ as an Aesthetic Category,” *Art Quarterly*, n.s. 1 (1977), pp. 108–9. She concludes her study of “the cultivation of taste for the natural phenomenon as singularity,” by insisting that “the lone natural object . . . need not be interpreted as human surrogates; on the contrary, [the 19th century Romantic landscape painter’s]
isolated, detached monoliths should be placed within the vitalist aesthetic tradition—emerging from the illustrated voyage—that valued the natural singular. One might refer to this tradition as that of a ‘neue Sachlichkeit’ in which the regard for the specifics of nature produces a repertory of animate particulars.” pp. 117–18.


16 Stanley Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say?, New York, Scribners, 1969, p. 91, n. 9.

17 Students of photography’s history are not encouraged to question whether art historical models might (or might not) apply. The session on the history of photography at the 1982 College Art Association meeting (a session proudly introduced as the fruits of real scholarly research at last applied to this formerly unsystematically studied field) was a display of what can go wrong. In the paper “Charles Marville, Popular Illustrator: Origins of a Photographic Aesthetic,” presented by Constance Kane Hungerford, the model of the necessary internal consistency of an oeuvre encouraged the idea that there had to be a stylistic connection between Marville’s early practice as an engraver and his later work as a photographer. The characterizations of style this promoted with regard to Marville’s photographic work (e.g., sharp contrasts of light and dark, hard, crisp contours) were not only hard to see, consistently, but when these did apply they did not distinguish him in any way from his fellows on the Mission Héliographique. For every “graphic” Marville, it is possible to find an equally graphic LeSecq.

18 An example of this is the nearly four miles of footage shot by Eisenstein in Mexico for his project Que Viva Mexico. Sent to California where it was developed, this footage was never seen by Eisenstein, who was forced to leave the U.S. immediately upon his return from Mexico. The footage was then cannibalized by two American editors to compose Thunder over Mexico and Time in the Sun. Neither of these is supposed to be part of Eisenstein’s oeuvre. Only a “shooting chronology” assembled by Jay Leyda in the Museum of Modern Art now exists. Its status in relation to Eisenstein’s oeuvre is obviously peculiar. But given Eisenstein’s nearly ten years of filmmaking experience at the time of the shooting, given also the state of the art of cinema in terms of the body of material that existed by 1930 and the extent to which this had been theorized, it is probable that Eisenstein had a more complete sense, from the script and his working conception of the film, of what he had made as a “work”—even though he never saw it—than the photographers of the Mission Héliographique could have had of theirs. The history of Eisenstein’s project is documented in full detail in Sergei Eisenstein and Upton Sinclair, The Making and Unmaking of “Que Viva Mexico,” ed. Harry M. Geduld and Ronald Gottesman, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1970.

19 See, Abigail Solomon-Godeau, “A Photographer in Jerusalem, 1855: Auguste Salzmann and His Times,” October, No. 18 (Fall 1981), p. 95. This essay raises some of the issues about the problematic nature of Salzmann’s work considered as oeuvre that are engaged above.

20 Man Ray arranged for publication of four photographs by Atget in La Révolution Surréaliste, three in the June 1926 issue, and one in the December 1926 issue. The exhibition Film und Foto, Stuttgart, 1929, included Atget, whose work was also reproduced in Foto-Auge, Stuttgart, Wedekind Verlag, 1929.


22 Ibid., p. 21.

23 The first published discussion of this problem characterizes it as follows: “Atget’s numbering system is puzzling. His pictures are not numbered in a simple serial system, but in a confusing manner. In many cases, low-numbered photographs are dated later than high-numbered photographs, and in many cases numbers are duplicated.” See, Barbara Michaels, “An Introduction to the Dating and Organization of Eugène Atget’s Photographs” The Art Bulletin, LXI (September 1979), p. 461.


27 Thus far the work of Alan Sekula has been the one consistent analysis of the history of photography to attack this effort. See, Alan Sekula, “The Traffic in Photographs,” Art Journal, XLI (Spring 1981), pp. 15–25; and “The Instrumental Image: Steichen at War,” Artforum, XIII (December 1975). A discussion of the rearrangement of the archive in relation to the need to protect the values of modernism is mounted by Douglas Crimp’s “The Museum’s Old/The Library’s New Subject,” Pera- chute, (Spring 1981).

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